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Abstract
Decision making in the context of crime execution and crime prevention can be
successfully investigated with the implementation of game-theoretic tools. Evolu-
tionary and mean-field game theory allow for the consideration of a large number of
interacting players organized in social and behavioural structures, which typically
characterize this context. Alternatively, ‘traditional’ game-theoretic approaches
can be applied for studying the security of an arbitrary network on a two player
non-cooperative game. Theoretically underpinned by these instruments, in this thesis
we formulate and analyse game-theoretic models of inspection, corruption, counter-
terrorism, patrolling, and similarly interpreted paradigms. Our analysis suggests
optimal strategies for the involved players, and illustrates the long term behaviour of
the introduced systems. Our contribution is towards the explicit formulation and the
thorough analysis of real life scenaria involving the security in network structures.
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of five chapters, the first chapter being the Introduction, and the
last chapter being the Conclusion. The main body consists of Chapters 2, 3, and 4.
In each one of Chapters 2, 3, and 4, a game-theoretic problem is described,
formulated, and thoroughly analysed. Although the aforementioned models can be
studied independently, they form a whole as they all discuss instances of networks
security concentrating primarily on inspection, corruption, counter-terrorism, and
patrolling. The network element in our modelling is introduced either through the
idea of a large number of interacting players organized in social and behavioural
structures, or through the traditional notion of two player games played on graphs.
Game theory provides the necessary scientific mechanisms required to investigate
these and relative contexts. In principle, game theory studies the strategic interaction
(conflict or cooperation) of rational individuals, that is, a game can be thought of as a
multi-agent decision problem in a strategic setting. This element of strategic decision
making where individuals’ actions are interdependent is what distinguishes game
theory from decision theory. For a general introduction one can recommend, e.g.,
Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev [2010], Myerson [2013], Osborne and Rubinstein [1994].
The publication of the Theory of games and economic behavior by von Neumann and
Morgenstern in 1944, Von Neumann and Morgenstern [2007], is widely recognised
as the first formal establishment of the field. Game theory has rapidly advanced
ever since, and has been used almost in every branch of social, natural and formal
sciences. Some of its prominent representatives were awarded the Nobel prize in
economics for their contribution to sub-fields of game theory over the latest years;
John Nash, John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten (1994), Robert Aumann and Thomas
Schelling (2005), Leonid Hurwicz, Eric Maskin and Roger Myerson (2007), Alvin
Roth and Lloyd Shapley (2012). In what follows, we briefly summarize what each of
1
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our introduced game-theoretic models entails. We strictly refer to dynamic game
paradigms, that is, to strategic interactions that reoccur over time, so that decision
making of the agents at any time influences the evolution of their system’s state and
thus their future reaction.
In Chapter 2, we extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero
sum, imperfect inspection game, including a large number of interacting inspectees
and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy within a finite/infinite
bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance
with the established rules. The inspectees may periodically update their strategies
after randomly inter-comparing the obtained payoffs, setting their collective behaviour
subject to evolutionary pressure. Accordingly, the inspector decides, at each update
period, the optimum fraction of his/her finite renewable budget to invest on his/her
interference with the inspectees’ collective effect. To deter the inspectees from
violating, the inspector assigns a fine (penalty) to each illegal strategy. We formulate
the game mathematically, study its dynamics, and investigate its evolution subject
to two key control parameters, the inspection budget and the punishment fine.
Introducing a simple linguistic twist, we additionally capture the relative conception
of a corruption game.
In Chapter 3, we combine the recently developed mean-field game models
of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, along with the evolutionary
game approach of inspection and corruption, under an extended scheme including
the pressure-resistance game element. We propose a generalised framework for
complex interaction in network structures of large number of small players, that
includes their individual decision making inside their environment (i.e. the mean-field
game component), their binary interactions (i.e. the evolutionary game component),
and the pressure of a major player (i.e. the pressure-resistance game component).
To perform concrete calculations with this overall complicated model, we suggest
working, in turn, in three asymptotic regimes; we assume fast execution of personal
decisions, weak binary interactions, and small discounting in time. We attempt
to provide a link between the stationary and the time-dependent mean-field game
consistency problem.
In Chapter 4, we consider a variation of the recently introduced network
patrolling game, where an Attacker carries out an attack on a node of his/her choice
for a given number m of consecutive time periods. The critical parameter m indicates
the difficulty of the attack, or infiltration, at a given node. To thwart such an attack,
the Patroller adopts a walk on the network, aiming to be at the attacked node during
one of the attack periods. If this occurs, the attack is intercepted and the Patroller
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wins the game; otherwise the Attacker wins. To model the important alternative
where the Patroller can be identified when he/she is at the Attacker’s node, we allow
the Attacker to initiate the attack after waiting for a chosen number d of consecutive
periods during which the Patroller has been away. Thus, we introduce the term
Uniformed Patroller (alternatively we can use the term noisy in contrast to silent)
to denote this new information structure. We solve this new version of the network
patrolling game, that is more favourable to the Attacker, for various networks: star,
line, circle and a mixture. We restrict the Patroller to Markovian strategies, which
cover the whole network.
Chapter 2
Evolutionary Inspection and
Corruption Games
2.1 Introduction
An inspection game consists of a game-theoretic framework, modelling the non-
cooperative interaction between two strategic parties, called the inspector and the
inspectee; see, e.g., Avenhaus, von Stengel and Zamir [2002], Avenhaus and Canty
[2012], Hohzaki [2013] for a general survey. The inspector aims to verify that certain
regulations, imposed by the benevolent principal he/she is acting for, are not violated
by the inspectee. On the contrary, the inspectee has a selfish incentive to disobey
the established regulations, risking the enforcement of a punishment fine in the case
of detection. The introduced punishment mechanism is a key element in the analysis
of inspection games, since deterrence is generally considered to be the inspector’s
highest priority. Typically, the inspector has limited means of inspection at his/her
disposal, so that his/her detection efficiency can only be partial.
The central objective of inspection games is to develop an effective inspection
policy for the inspector to adopt, given that the inspectee acts according to a
strategic plan. Within the last five decades, inspection games have been applied in
the game-theoretic analysis of a wide range of issues, mainly in arms control and
nuclear non-proliferation, but also in the accounting and auditing of accounts, in
tax inspections, environmental protection, crime control, passenger ticket control,
stock-keeping and many others; see, e.g., Alferov, Malafeyev and Maltseva [2015],
Avenhaus, von Stengel and Zamir [2002], Avenhaus [2004], Deutsch et al. [2013]
and the references therein. Though when initially introduced, inspection games
appeared almost exclusively as two-person, zero-sum, non-cooperative games, the
4
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need to depict more realistic, and therefore of increased complexity, scenaria gradually
shifted attention towards N-person and non-zero-sum games.
Dresher’s two-person, zero-sum, perfect recall, recursive inspection game,
Dresher [1962], is widely recognized as the first formal approach in the field. In his
model, Dresher considered n periods of time available for an inspectee to commit,
or not, a unique violation, and m ≤ n one-period lasting inspections available for
the inspector to investigate the inspectee’s abidance by the rules, assuming that a
violator can be detected only if he/she is caught (inspected) in the act. This work
initiated the application of inspection games to arms control and disarmament; see,
e.g., Avenhaus et al. [1996] and the references therein. Maschler [1966] generalized
this archetypal model, introduced the equivalent non-zero-sum game and, most
importantly, adopted from economics the notion of inspector leadership, showing
(among others) that the inspector’s option to pre-announce and commit to a mixed
inspection strategy actually increases his/her expected payoff.
Thomas and Nisgav [1976] used a similar framework to investigate the problem
of a patroller aiming to inhibit a smuggler’s illegal activity. In their so-called
customs-smuggler game, customs patrol, using a speedboat, in order to detect
a smuggler’s motorboat attempting to ship contraband through a strait. They
introduced the possibility of more than one patrolling boats, namely the possibility
of two or more inspectors, potentially not identical, and suggested the use of linear
programming methods for the solution of those scenario. Baston and Bostock [1991]
provided a closed-form solution for the case of two patrolling boats, and discussed
the withdrawal of the perfect-capture assumption, stating that detection is ensured
whenever violation and inspection take place at the same period. Garnaev [1994]
provided a closed-form solution for the case of three patrolling boats.
Von Stengel [1991] introduced a third parameter in Dresher’s game, allowing
multiple violations, but proving that the inspector’s optimal strategy is independent
of the maximum number of the inspectee’s intended violations. He studied another
variation, optimizing the detection time of a unique violation that is detected at
the following inspection, given that inspection does not currently take place. On a
later version, von Stengel [2016] additionally considered different rewards for the
inspectee’s successfully committed violations, extending as well Maschler’s inspector
leadership version under the multiple intended violations assumption. Ferguson and
Melolidakis [1998], motivated by Sakaguchi [1977], treated a similar three-parameter,
perfect-capture, sequential game, where: (i) the inspectee has the option to ‘legally’
violate at an additional cost; (ii) a detected violation does not terminate the game;
(iii) every non-inspected violation is disclosed to the inspector at the following stage.
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Non-zero-sum inspection games were already discussed at an early stage by
Maschler [1966, 1967], but were mainly developed after the 1980s, in the context of the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT). The prefect-capture assumption was partly
abandoned, and errors of Type 1 (false alarm) and Type 2 (undetected violation given
that inspection takes place) were introduced to formulate the so-called imperfect
inspection games. Avenhaus and von Stengel [1992] solved Dresher’s perfect-capture,
sequential game, assuming non-zero-sum payoffs. Canty, Rothenstein and Avenhaus
[2001] solved an imperfect, non-sequential game, assuming that players ignore any
information they collect during their interaction, where an illegal action must be
detected within a critical timespan before its effect is irreversible. They discussed the
sequential equivalent, as well. Rothenstein and Zamir [2002] included the elements
of imperfect inspection and timely detection in the context of environmental control,
extending Diamond’s models for a single inspection, Diamond [1982].
Avenhaus and Kilgour [2004] introduced a non-zero-sum, imperfect (Type 2
error) inspection game, where a single inspector can continuously distribute his/her
effort-resources between two non-interacting inspectees, exempted from the simplistic
dilemma whether to inspect or not. They related the inspector’s detection efficiency
with the inspection effort through a non-linear detection function and derived results
for the inspector’s optimum strategy subject to its convexity. Hohzaki [2007] moved
two steps forward, considering a similar n+ 1 players inspection game, where the
single inspection authority not only intends to optimally distribute his effort among
n inspectee countries, but also among lk facilities within each inspectee country
k. Hohzaki presents a method of identifying a Nash equilibrium for the game and
discusses several properties of the players’ optimal strategies.
In the special case when the inspector becomes himself/herself the individual
under investigation, namely when the philosophical question “Who will guard the
guardians?” eventually arises (first stated in the work of the Roman satirist Juvenal,
Satire VI, Green [2004]), see Hurwicz [2008], the exact same framework can be used
for modelling corruption. In the so-called corruption games, a benevolent principal
aims to ensure that his/her non-benevolent affiliate does not intentionally fail his/her
duty; see, e.g., Aidt [2003], Jain [2001], Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev [2015], Malafeyev,
Redinskikh and Alferov [2014] and the references therein for a general survey.
For example, in the tax audit/inspection regime, the tax inspectors employed
by the respective competent authority are often open to bribery from the tax payers
in order not to report detected tax evasions. Generally speaking, when we switch
from inspection to corruption games, the competing pair of an inspector versus an
inspectee is replaced by the pair of a benevolent principal versus a non-benevolent
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employee, but the framework of analysis that is used for the first one can almost
identically be applied for the second one, as well.
Lambert-Mogiliansky, Majumdar and Radner [2008] developed a dynamic
game where various private investors anticipate the processing of their applications
by an ordered number of low level bureaucrats in order to ensure specific privileges;
such an application is approved only if every bureaucrat is bribed. Nikolaev [2014]
introduced a game theoretic study of corruption with a hierarchical structure, where
inspectors of different levels audit the inspectors of the lower level and report
(potentially false reports) to the inspectors of the higher level; the inspector of the
highest level is assumed to be honest. In the context of ecosystem management
and biodiversity conservation, Lee et al. [2015] studied an evolutionary game, where
they analyse illegal logging with respect to the corruption of forest rule enforcers,
while in the context of politics and governance, Giovannoni and Seidmann [2014]
investigated how power may affect the government dynamics of simple models of
a dynamic democracy, assuming that “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely” (the famous quote of the British politician Lord Acton).
In this chapter we focus on the study of inspection (and corruption) games
from an evolutionary perspective, aimed at the analysis of the class of games with
a large number of inspectees. However, we highlight that our setting should be
distinctly separated from the general setting of the standard evolutionary game theory.
We emphasize the networking aspects of these games by allowing the inspectees
to communicate with each other and update their strategies purely on account of
their interactions. This way, we depict the real-life scenario of partially-informed,
optimizing, interacting, indistinguishable agents. For the same purpose, we set
the inspectees to choose from different levels of illegal behaviour. Additionally,
we introduce the inspector’s budget as a distinct parameter of the game, and we
measure his/her interference with the interacting inspectees with respect to this. We
examine carefully the critical effect of the punishment fine on the evolution of the
game. In fact, we attempt to get quantitative insights into the interplay of these key
parameters and analyse respectively the dynamics of the game.
For a real-world implementation of our game, one can think of tax inspections.
Tax payers are ordinary citizens who interact on a daily basis exchanging information
on various issues. Arguably, in their vast majority, if not universally, tax payers
have a selfish incentive towards tax evasion. Depending on the degree of confidence
they have in their fellow citizens, on a pairwise level, they discuss their methods, the
extent to which they evade taxes and their obtained payoffs. As experience suggests,
interacting agents, and therefore the tax payers as well, imitate the more profitable
Draft of 9:20 pm, Sunday, March 25, 2018 8
strategies. The tax inspector (say the chief of the tax department) is in charge of
fighting tax evasion. Having to deal with many tax payers, primarily he/she aims
to confront their collective effect rather than each one individually. Then, provided
with a bounded budget from a superior authority (say the finance ministry), the tax
inspector aims to manage this, along with his/her punishment policy, so that he/she
maximizes his/her utility (namely the payoff of the tax department).
Though we restrict ourselves to the use of inspection game terminology, our
model also intends to capture the relevant class of corruption games as those are
introduced above. Indicatively, we aim to investigate the dynamics of the interaction
between a large group of corrupted bureaucrats and their incorruptible superior,
again from an evolutionary perspective. In accordance with our earlier approach, the
bureaucrats discuss in pairs their bribes and copy the more efficient strategies, while
their incorruptible superior aims to choose attractive wages to discourage bribery, to
invest in means of detecting fraudulent behaviour and to adopt a suitable punishment
policy. Evidently, the two game settings are fully analogous, and despite the linguistic
twist of inspection to corruption, they can be formulated in an identical way.
We organize Chapter 2 as follows. In Section 2.2, we discuss the standard
setting of a two-player, non-cooperative, non-zero-sum inspection game, and we
introduce what we call the conventional inspection game. In Sections 2.3 and 2.4, we
present our generalization; we extend the two-player inspection game considering a
large population of indistinguishable inspectees, interacting against a single inspector,
we formulate our model for a discrete and a continuous strategy setting respectively,
and we demonstrate our analysis of the system’s dynamics. In Section 2.5, we include
a game-theoretic interpretation of our fixed points analysis.
2.2 Standard Inspection Game
A standard inspection game describes the strictly competitive interaction between
an inspectee and an inspector, whose interests in principle contradict. The inspectee,
having to obey certain rules imposed by the inspector, either chooses indeed to
comply with the established rules, obtaining a legal profit, r > 0, or to violate them,
targeting at an additional illegal profit, ` > 0, but undertaking additionally the risk
of being detected and, consequently, having to pay the corresponding punishment
fine, f > 0. Likewise, the inspector chooses either to inspect at some given inspection
cost, c > 0, in order to detect any occurring violation, ward off the loss from the
violator’s illegal profit and receive the debited fine, or not to inspect, avoiding the
cost of inspection, but risking the occurrence of a non-detected violation.
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In this two-player game-theoretic setting, both parties are considered to be
rational optimizers who decide their strategies independently of each other, without
observing or being informed about their competitor’s behaviour. Namely, the game
under discussion is a non-cooperative one. The following 2× 2 normal-form table
(Table 2.1) illustrates the framework we described above, where the inspectee is
the row player and the inspector is the column player. Left and right cells’ entries
correspond to the inspectee’s and the inspector’s payoffs respectively. Notice that,
in general, the game is formulated as a non-zero-sum one.
Inspect Not Inspect
Violate r − f , −c+ f r + `, −`
Comply r, −c r, 0
Table 2.1: Two-player perfect inspection game.
Table 2.1 illustrates the so-called perfect inspection game, in the sense that
inspection always coincides with detection (i.e. given that a violator is inspected,
the inspector will detect his/her violation with probability one). However, this is
an obviously naive approach, since in practice, numerous factors deteriorate the
inspector’s efficiency and potentially obstruct detection (recall the errors of Type 1
and Type 2 we mentioned above). Consequently, the need to introduce a game
parameter determining the inspection’s efficiency naturally arises.
In this more general setting, the critical parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] is introduced to
measure the conditional probability with which a violation is detected given that
the inspector conducts an inspection. Alternatively, one can think of λ as a measure
of the inspector’s detection efficiency. Obviously, for λ = 1, the ideal scenario of
perfect inspection is captured, while, for λ = 0, detection can be never achieved.
The following 2× 2 normal-form table (Table 2.2) illustrates the so-called imperfect
inspection game.
Inspect Not Inspect
Violate r + `− λ · (`+ f), −c− `+ λ · (`+ f) r + `, −`
Comply r, −c r, 0
Table 2.2: Two-player imperfect inspection game.
The key feature of the discussed game setting is that under specific conditions,
it describes a two-player competitive interaction without any pure strategy Nash
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equilibria. Starting from the natural assumption that the inspector, in principle,
would like the inspectee to comply with his/her rules, and that ideally he/she would
prefer to ensure compliance without having to inspect, the game obtains no pure
strategy Nash equilibria when both of the following two conditions apply
−c− `+ λ · (`+ f) > −`⇒ λ · (f + `) > c, (2.1)
r > r + `− λ · (`+ f)⇒ λ · (f + `) > `. (2.2)
Indicatively, one can verify that the pure strategy profile (V, I), where V
stands for Violate and I stands for Inspect, is the unique Nash equilibrium of
the imperfect inspection game when only condition (2.1) applies. Accordingly,
profile (V,NI), where NI stands for Not Inspect, is the unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium when only condition (2.2) applies. When neither of the two conditions
apply, profile (V,NI) is again the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Hence,
given that at least one of the above conditions (2.1) and (2.2) does not apply, a pure
strategy equilibrium solution always exists.
Back to the no pure strategy Nash equilibria environment, the first condition
assumes that when the inspectee is violating, the inspector’s expected payoff is higher
when he/she chooses to inspect. Accordingly, the second condition assumes that
when the inspector is inspecting, the inspectee’s expected payoff is higher when
he/she chooses to comply (note that this is always true for the perfect inspection
game of Table 2.1).
Under these assumptions, regardless of the game’s outcome and given the
competitor’s choice, both players would in turn switch their previously chosen
strategies to the alternative ones, in an endlessly repeated switching cycle (see Figure
2.1). This lack of no-regrets pure strategies states that the game contains no pure
strategy Nash equilibria. We name it the conventional inspection game.
Comply Not Inspect Violate Inspect Comply
. . .
- - - - -
Figure 2.1: No pure strategy Nash equilibria conventional inspection game.
Typically, a two-player game without any pure strategy Nash equilibria is
resolved by having at least one of the players randomising over his/her available
pure strategies. In this specific scenario, it can be proven that both players resort
to mixed strategies, implying that both inspection and violation take place with
non-zero probabilities. In particular, the following theorem proven in Kolokoltsov
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and Malafeyev [2010] gives the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the
conventional inspection game described above.
Theorem 1. Let p ∈ [0, 1] be the probability with which the inspectee violates and
q ∈ [0, 1] be the probability with which the inspector inspects. The unique mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium of the two-player inspection game described in Table 2.2
along with conditions (2.1) and (2.2) is the mixed strategy profile (p∗, q∗) with:
p∗ =
c
λ · (f + `) , q
∗ =
`
λ · (f + `) . (2.3)
Proof. See Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev [2010].
2.3 Discrete Strategy Setting
Let us now proceed with the natural extension of the two-player game we introduced
in the previous section to the real-life scenario of a multi-player problem.
We consider a large population of N indistinguishable, pairwise interacting
inspectees exchanging opinions under the pressure of a single inspector. Equivalently
in the context of corruption games, one can think of N indistinguishable, pairwise
interacting bureaucrats against their incorruptible superior. The game mechanism
can be summarized into the following dynamic process.
Initially, the N inspectees decide their strategies individually. They retain
their group’s initial strategy profile for a certain time span, but beyond that point,
on account of the inspector’s response to their collective effect, some of the inspectees
are eager to update and switch to evidently more profitable strategies. In principle,
we assume that an inspectee is an updater with a non-zero probability ω that is
characteristic of the inspectees’ population.
Indicatively, assume on a periodic basis, and in particular at the beginning of
each update period, that an updater discusses his/her payoff with another randomly-
chosen inspectee, who is not necessarily an updater himself/herself. If the two
interacting inspectees have equal payoffs, then the updater retains his/her strategy.
If, however, they have a payoff gap, then the updater is likely to revise his/her
strategy, subject to how significant their payoffs’ difference is.
Clearly, we do not treat the inspectees as strictly rational optimizers. Instead,
we assume that they periodically compare their obtained payoffs in pairs, and
they mechanically copy more efficient strategies purely in view of their pairwise
interaction and without necessarily being aware of the overall prevailing crime rate
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or the inspector’s response. This assumption is described as the myopic hypothesis,
and we introduce it to illustrate the lack of perfect information and the frequently
adopted imitating behaviour in various multi-agent social systems. However, as we
will see in Section 2.5, ignoring the myopic hypothesis in a strictly game-theoretic
context, we can still interpret our results.
Regarding the inspector’s response, we no longer consider his/her strategy
to be the choice of the inspection frequency (recall the inspector’s dilemma in the
standard game setting whether to inspect or not). Instead, we take into account
the overall effort the inspector devotes to his/her inspection activity. In particular,
we identify this generic term as the fraction of the available budget that he/she
invests on his/her objective, making the assumption that the inspection budget
controls every factor related with his/her detection effectiveness (e.g., the inspection
frequency, the no-detection probability, the false alarms, etc.).
At each update event, we assume that the inspector is limited to the same
finite, renewable available budget B. Without experiencing any policy-adjusting
costs, he/she aims at maximizing his/her payoff against each different distribution
of the inspectees’ strategies at the least possible cost. Additionally, we assume that
at each time point, he/she is perfectly informed about the inspectees’ collective
behaviour. Therefore, we treat the inspector as a rational, straightforward, payoff
maximizing player. This suggestion is described as the best response principle.
Under this game-theoretic framework, the distribution of violating the es-
tablished regulation in the population of the inspectees is subject to evolutionary
pressure over time. As a result, the term evolutionary is introduced to describe the
inspection (corruption) game. It turns out that the more efficient strategies gradually
become dominant through imitation.
2.3.1 Analysis
We initiate our analysis by assuming that the inspectees choose their strategies within
a finite bounded set of strategies S = {0, 1, ..., d}, generating increasingly illegal
profits. Their group’s state space is then the set of sequences of d+ 1 non-negative
integers n = (n0, . . . , nd), ni denoting the occupation frequency of strategy i ∈ S.
Equivalently, it is the set of sequences of the corresponding d+ 1 relative occupation
frequencies x = (x0, . . . , xd), where xi = ni/N .
We consider a constant number of inspectees, namely we have N = n0+· · ·+nd
for every group’s state n. Provided that the population size N is sufficiently large
(formally the following is valid for N →∞ through the law of large numbers), we
approximate the relative occupation frequencies xi with ρi ∈ [0, 1], denoting the
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probabilities with which the strategies i ∈ S are adopted. To each strategy i we
assign an illegal profit `i, `0 = 0 characterizing the compliers, and a strictly increasing
punishment fine fi = f(`i), with f0 = 0. We assume that |`i+1 − `i| is constant,
namely that `i’s form a one-dimensional regular lattice.
As explained, the inspector has to deal with an evolving crime distribution in
the population of the inspectees, that is p = p(t) = (ρi)(t). We thus define the set of
probability vectors Σd+1, such that:
Σd+1 =
{
p(t) = (ρ0, . . . , ρd)(t) ∈ Rd+1+ :
∑
ρi(t) = 1
}
. (2.4)
We introduce the inner product notation to define the group’s expected
(average) illegal profit by ¯`= ¯`(p) = 〈`,p〉. Respectively, we define the group’s ex-
pected (average) punishment fine by f¯ = f¯(p) = 〈f,p〉. We also define the inspector’s
invested budget against crime distribution p by b(·) ∈ [0, B] and the inspector’s
efficiency by G(b). The last function measures the probability with which a violating
inspectee is detected given that the inspector invests budget b.
To depict a plausible scenario, we assume that perfect efficiency cannot be
achieved within the inspector’s finite available inspection budget B (namely, the
detection probability is strictly smaller than one, G(B) < 1).
Assumption 1. The inspector’s efficiency, G : [0,∞) 7→ [0, 1), is a twice continu-
ously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave function, satisfying:
G′′ < 0, G′ > 0, lim
x→0
G′(x) =∞, G(0) = 0, lim
x→∞G(x) = 1.
An inspectee who plays strategy i ∈ S, either escapes undetected with
probability 1−G(b) and obtains an illegal profit `i, or gets detected with probability
G(b) and is charged with a fine fi. Additionally, every inspectee receives a legal
income r, regardless of his/her strategy being legal or illegal.
Therefore, to an inspectee playing strategy i, against the inspector investing
budget b, we assign the following inspectee’s payoff function:
Πi(b) = r +
(
1−G(b)) · `i −G(b) · fi. (2.5)
Accordingly, we need to introduce a payoff function for the inspector investing
budget b against a crime distribution p. Recall that the inspector is playing against a
large population of indistinguishable, interacting agents and intends to suppress their
collective illegal behaviour. That being the case, for his/her macroscopic assessment,
the larger the group is, the less considerable the absolute values corresponding to a
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single agent ( i.e., r, `i, fi ) are. To depict this inspector’s subjective evaluation, we
introduce the inspector’s payoff function as follows:
ΠI(b,p, N) = −b+N ·G(b) · f¯t · κ
N
−N · (1−G(b)) · ¯`t · κ
N
, (2.6)
where κ is a positive scaling constant and ¯`t, respectively f¯t, denotes the expected
(average) illegal profit, respectively the expected (average) punishment fine, at time t.
Without loss of generality, we can set κ = 1. Note that the inspector’s payoff always
obtains a finite value, including the limit N →∞.
As already mentioned, an inspectee (updater) revises his/her strategy with a
switching probability depending on his/her payoff’s difference with another randomly-
chosen individual’s payoff, with whom he/she discusses outcomes. Then, for an
updater playing strategy i ∈ S and exchanging information with an inspectee playing
strategy j ∈ S, we define this switching probability by sij ·∆t, for a timespan ∆t,
where:
sij =
 β ·
(
Πj(b)−Πi(b)
)
, if Πj(b) > Πi(b)
0 , if Πj(b) ≤ Πi(b)
(2.7)
and β > 0 is an appropriately-scaled normalization parameter.
This transition can be summarised in the following dynamic process; in every
period following an update event, the number of inspectees playing strategy i is
equal to the corresponding sub-population in the previous period, plus the number of
inspectees having previously played strategies j 6= i and switching now into strategy i,
minus the number of inspectees having previously played strategy i and switching
now into strategies j 6= i.
Hence, we derive the following iteration formula:
ρi(t+ ∆t) = ρi(t) +ω ·ρi(t) ·
d∑
j=0
(
ρj(t) · sij
) ·∆t−ω ·ρi(t) · d∑
j=0
(
ρj(t) · sji
) ·∆t (2.8)
which can be suitably reformulated, taking the limit as ∆t → 0, into an equation
resembling the well-known replicator equation (see, e.g., Zeeman [1980]):
ρ˙i(t) = ω · β · ρi(t) ·
(
Πi(b)−
∑
j∈S
ρj ·Πj(b)
)
. (2.9)
Remark 1. We have used here a heuristic technique to derive equation (2.9), bearing
in mind that we consider a significantly large group of interacting individuals (formally
valid for the limiting case of an infinitely large population). A rigorous derivation
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with the use of the law of large numbers for interacting Markov chains can be found
for example in Kolokoltsov [2012] or Kolokoltsov [2014].
In agreement with our game setting (in particular with the myopic hypothesis),
equation (2.9) is not a best-response dynamic. However, it turns out that successful
strategies, yielding payoffs higher than the group’s average payoff, are subject to
evolutionary pressure. This interesting finding of our setting, which is put forward
in the above replicator equation, simply states that although the inspectees are
not considered to be strictly rational maximizers (but instead myopic optimizers),
successful strategies propagate into their population through the imitation procedure.
This characteristic classifies equation (2.9) into the class of the payoff monotonic
game dynamics, see, e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund [1998].
Before proceeding any further, it is important to state that our setting
is quite different from the general setting of standard evolutionary game theory.
Unlike standard evolutionary games, in our approach there are no small games of a
fixed number of players through which successful strategies evolve. On the contrary,
at each step and throughout the whole procedure, there is only one N + 1 players
game taking place (see also the analysis in Section 2.5).
In regard to the inspector’s interference with the interacting inspectees, the
best response principle states that at each time step, against the crime distribution
he/she confronts, the inspector aims to maximize his/her instantaneous payoff with
respect to his/her available budget:
max
b∈[0,B]
{−b+G(b) · f¯t − (1−G(b)) · ¯`t}. (2.10)
On the one hand, the inspector chooses his/her fine policy strategically in
order to manipulate the evolution of the future crime distribution. On the other
hand, at each update period, he/she has at his/her disposal the same finite renewable
budget B, while he/she is not charged with any policy adjusting costs. Namely,
the inspector has a period-long planning horizon regarding his/her financial policy,
and he/she instantaneously chooses at each step his/her response b that maximizes
his/her payoff (2.6) against the prevailing crime distribution.
Let us define the inspector’s best response (optimum employable budget),
maximizing his/her payoff (2.6) against the prevailing crime distribution, by:
bˆ(·) := argmax
b∈[0,B]
{−b+G(b) · (f¯t + ¯`t)− ¯`t}. (2.11)
Having analytically discussed the inspectees’ and the inspector’s individual
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dynamic characteristics, we can now combine them and obtain a clear view of the
system’s dynamic behaviour as a whole.
In particular, we substitute the inspector’s best response (optimum employable
budget) bˆ(·) into the system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs) (2.9), and
we obtain the corresponding system governing the dynamic evolution of the non-
cooperative game described above:
ρ˙i(t) = ω · β · ρi(t) ·
(
`i − (`i + fi) ·G(bˆ) +G(bˆ) · (¯`+ f¯)− ¯`
)
. (2.12)
Recall that through the system (2.12) we aim to investigate the evolution
of illegal behaviour within a large group of interacting, myopically-maximizing,
indistinguishable inspectees (bureaucrats) under the pressure of a single rationally-
maximizing inspector (incorruptible superior).
Without loss of generality, we can set the normalization parameter β = 1.
Let us also introduce the following auxiliary notation:
Ki(p, bˆ) = `i − ( `i + fi ) ·G(bˆ) +G(bˆ) · (¯`+ f¯)− ¯`. (2.13)
Proposition 1. A probability vector p(t) ∈ Σd+1 is a singular point of (2.12),
namely it satisfies the system of equations:
ω · ρi(t) ·Ki(p, bˆ) = 0, (2.14)
if and only if there exists a subset I ⊂ S, such that ρi(t) = 0 for i ∈ I, and
Ki(p, bˆ) = 0 for i /∈ I.
Proof. For any subset I ⊂ S such that ρi(t) = 0, i ∈ I, system (2.12) reduces to
the same system, but only with the coordinates i /∈ I (notice that I must be a
proper subset of S). Then, for the fixed point condition to be satisfied, we must
have Kj(p, bˆ) = 0 for every j ∈ S\I.
The determination of the fixed points defined in Proposition 1, as well as their
stability analysis (namely the deterministic evolution of the game), clearly depend
on the explicit form of the auxiliary function Ki. One can distinguish, then, two
control elements that appear in Ki and thus govern the dynamics of the game; the
functional control f(·) and the control parameter B. We have set the fine f(·) to be
a strictly increasing function, and we further consider three eventualities regarding
its convexity; (i) linear; (ii) convex; (iii) concave. To each of the above three versions
Draft of 9:20 pm, Sunday, March 25, 2018 17
we assign a different inspector’s punishment profile.
Indicatively, we claim that a convex fine function reveals an inspector who
is lenient against relatively low collective violation, but rapidly jumps to stricter
policies when coming up against increasing collective violation. On the contrary,
we claim that a concave fine function reveals an inspector who is already punishing
aggressively even for a relatively low collective violation (pre-empting inspector).
Finally, we assume that a linear fine function represents the severity of the ‘average’
inspector. In each case, we vary the constant, increasing, or decreasing gradient of
function f(·), respectively for a linear, convex, or concave fine. Accordingly, we vary
the size of the finite available budget B.
The different settings we establish with these control parameter variations,
and therefore, the corresponding dynamics we obtain in each occasion, have clear
practical interpretation providing useful insight into applications. For example, the
fine function f(·) can be, and usually is, defined by the inspector himself (think of
the different fine policies when dealing with tax evasion), while the level of budget
B is decided from the benevolent principal by whom the inspector is employed.
Contrariwise, the detection efficiency G(·) is not regarded as an additional
control since it characterizes the inspector’s behaviour endogenously. However, say
the inspector has an excess of budget, which he/she could invest in improving his/her
expertise (e.g., the technical know-how). This is related (indirectly) with his/her
efficiency, and thus could partially improve G(·). We do not engage with this scenario.
2.3.2 Linear Fine
Equivalently to (2.11), for a linear fine fi = σ · `i, σ ∈ R+, the inspector’s best
response (optimum employable budget) can be written as:
bˆ(¯`) = min
[
B, (G
′
)
−1
( 1
σ · ¯`t + ¯`t
)]
. (2.15)
We conclude from (2.15) that we cannot have bˆ(¯`) > B for every ¯`∈ [0, `d],
since at least for the case when ¯`= 0, it is bˆ(0) = 0. However, depending on the size
of the available budget B, we may have B > bˆ(¯`) for every ¯`∈ [0, `d].
Then, it is reasonable to introduce the following notation:
`c := min
{
` : bˆ(`) = B
}
, (2.16)
where `c is not necessarily deliverable, i.e., `c may not belong to [0, `d]. One should
think of this critical value `c as a measure of the adequacy of the inspector’s available
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budget B, namely as the ‘strength’ of his/her available budget. Obviously, if `c ≤ `d,
the inspector benefits from exhausting all his/her available budget when dealing
with a collective violation ¯`∈ [`c, `d], while, if `c > `d, the inspector never needs to
exhaust B in order to achieve an optimum response.
Theorem 2. Let Assumption 1 hold. The d + 1 unit vectors pi = (δij), i, j ∈ S,
lying on the vertices of the d-simplex, are fixed points of (2.12). Moreover:
1. If G(bˆ(`d)) >
1
1+σ , there is additionally a unique hyperplane of fixed points,
Θ =
{
pθ ∈ Σd+1 | ∃! ¯`∈ (0,min[`c, `d]) : 〈`,pθ〉 = ¯` & G(bˆ(¯`)) = 1
1 + σ
}
,
2. If G(bˆ(`d)) =
1
1+σ and `d > `c, there are additionally infinitely many hyper-
planes of fixed points,
Φ =
{
pφ ∈ Σd+1 | ∀ ¯`∈ [`c, `d] : 〈`,pφ〉 = ¯` & G(bˆ(¯`)) = 1
1 + σ
}
.
Proof. In any case, the unit probability vectors pi = (δij), i, j ∈ S, satisfy system
(2.14), since by the definition of pi, it is ρj = 0, ∀ j 6= i, whilst it is 〈`,pi〉 = `i.
The setting we introduce with Assumption 1 ensures that bˆ : [0, `d] 7→ [0, bˆ(`d)]
is a continuous, non-decreasing, surjective function. In particular, we have that G(·)
is strictly increasing in bˆ ∈ [0, B] and bˆ(·) is strictly increasing in ¯`∈ [0,min[`c, `d]].
Hence, the following hold:
1. When G(bˆ(`d)) >
1
1+σ , there is a unique average value
¯` ∈ (0,min[`c, `d])
satisfying G(bˆ(¯`)) = 11+σ . This unique
¯` is generated by infinitely many
probability vectors, pθ : 〈`,pθ〉 = ¯`, forming a hyperplane of vector points
satisfying (2.14).
2. When G(bˆ(`d)) =
1
1+σ and `d > `c, every average value
¯` ∈ [`c, `d] satisfies
G(bˆ(¯`)) = 11+σ . Each one of these infinitely many
¯` is generated by infinitely
many probability vectors, pφ : 〈`, pφ〉 = ¯`, forming infinitely many hyperplanes
of vector points satisfying (2.14).
We refer to the vector points pi as pure strategy fixed points, to emphasize that
they correspond to the population’s strategy profiles such that every inspectee plays
the same strategy i ∈ S. Accordingly, we refer to the vector points pθ, pφ, as mixed
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strategy fixed points, to emphasize that they correspond to the population’s strategy
profiles such that the inspectees are distributed among two or more strategies.
Before proceeding with the general stability results, we present the detailed
picture in the simplest case of three available strategies generating increasingly illegal
profits including compliance.
p0
p1
p2
(a) G(bˆ(`2)) ≤ 11+σ
p0
p1
p2
(b) G(bˆ(`1)) <
1
1+σ
< G(bˆ(`2))
p0
p1
p2
(c) 1
1+σ
< G(bˆ(`1)) < G(bˆ(`2))
Figure 2.2: Dynamics for a linear f(·), where `c ≥ `d. Set of strategies S = {0, 1, 2}.
p0
p1
p2
(a) G(bˆ(`2)) <
1
1+σ
p0
p1
p2
(b) G(bˆ(`1)) <
1
1+σ
= G(bˆ(`2))
p0
p1
p2
(c) G(bˆ(`1)) =
1
1+σ
= G(bˆ(`2))
p0
p1
p2
(d) G(bˆ(`1)) <
1
1+σ
< G(bˆ(`2))
p0
p1
p2
(e) 1
1+σ
< G(bˆ(`1)) < G(bˆ(`2))
Figure 2.3: Dynamics for a linear f(·), where `d > `c. Set of strategies S = {0, 1, 2}.
Figure 2.2 represents a budget B such that the inspector never exhausts
it. For a relatively low B, or for an overly lenient f(·) (see Figures 2.2(a), 2.3(a)),
the pure strategy fixed point p2 is asymptotically stable. Increasing though B or,
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accordingly, toughening up the fine policy f(·) (see Figure 2.2(b)), a hyperplane
of asymptotically stable mixed strategy fixed points appears. Depending on the
critical parameter `c, we may have infinitely many hyperplanes of asymptotically
stable mixed strategy fixed points (see Figures 2.3(b), 2.3(d)). Finally, keeping B
constant, the more we increase the slope of f(·), the closer this(ese) hyperplane(s)
moves towards compliance (see Figures 2.2(c), 2.3(c), and 2.3(e)).
We generalize these results into the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Let Assumption 1 hold. Consider the fixed points given by Theorem 2.
Then:
1. the pure strategy fixed point p0 is a source, thus unstable;
2. the pure strategy fixed points pj /∈ Θ,Φ, j ∈ S : j 6= 0, d, are saddles, thus
unstable;
3. the pure strategy fixed point pd is asymptotically stable when Φ = Θ = ∅;
otherwise, it is a source, thus unstable;
4. the mixed strategy fixed points pθ, pφ are asymptotically stable.
Proof. See Section 2.6.
2.3.3 Convex/Concave Fine
Let us introduce the auxiliary variable ξi = `i + fi. As we did before, using the inner
product notation, we define the corresponding group’s expected (average) value by
ξ¯ = ξ¯(p) = 〈ξ, p〉, where ξ¯ = ¯`+ f¯ . Then, equivalently to expression (2.11), or (2.15),
the inspector’s best response (optimum employable budget) can be written as:
bˆ(ξ¯) = min
[
B, (G
′
)
−1
( 1
ξ¯t
)]
. (2.17)
For every i, j ∈ S : i < j, let us introduce as well the parameter:
qi,j =
`i − `j
`i − `j + fi − fj . (2.18)
Lemma 1. For a convex fine, qi,j is strictly decreasing in i for constant j (or vice
versa), while for a concave fine, qi,j is strictly increasing in i for constant j (or vice
versa). Furthermore, for a convex fine, qi,j is strictly decreasing in i, j for constant
(j − i), while for a concave fine, qi,j is strictly increasing in i, j for constant (j − i).
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Theorem 4. Let Assumption 1 hold. The d + 1 unit vectors pi = (δij), i, j ∈ S,
lying on the vertices of the d-simplex are fixed points of system (2.12). Moreover,
there may be additionally up to
(
d+1
2
)
internal fixed points pi,j ∈ Σd+1, living on the
support of two strategies i, j ∈ S : i < j, uniquely defined for each pair of strategies;
these internal fixed points exist given that the following condition applies respectively:
G(bˆ(ξj)) > q
i,j > G(bˆ(ξi)). (2.19)
Proof. In any case, the unit probability vectors pi = (δij) satisfy system (2.14), since
by the definition of pi, it is ρj = 0, ∀ j 6= i, whilst it is 〈`,pi〉 = `i, 〈f, pi〉 = fi.
Consider now a probability vector p∗ ∈ Σd+1 satisfying (2.14), such that
〈`, p∗〉 = `∗, 〈f, p∗〉 = f∗, 〈ξ, p∗〉 = ξ∗ and p∗ 6= pi. Then, from Proposition 1, vector
p∗ should satisfy Ki(p∗, bˆ) = 0, ∀ i /∈ I, namely the fraction qi,j should be constant
∀ i, j /∈ I, and equal to G(bˆ(ξ∗)).
To satisfy this, according to Lemma 1, the complement set I
′
= S\I may
not contain more than two elements, namely the distributions p∗ may live on the
support of only two strategies.
For such a distribution p∗ = pi,j , such that 〈`, pi,j〉 = `i · ρi + `j · ρj = `i,j and
〈f, pi,j〉 = fi · ρi + fj · ρj = fi,j , i, j ∈ S : i < j, where `i,j + fi,j = ξi,j , we get:
G(bˆ(ξi,j)) = q
i,j . (2.20)
The setting we introduce with Assumption 1 ensures that bˆ : [0, ξd] 7→ [0, bˆ(ξd)]
is a continuous, non-decreasing, surjective function. In particular, we have that G(·)
is strictly increasing in bˆ ∈ [0, B] and bˆ(·) is strictly increasing in ξ¯ ∈ [0,min[ξc, ξd]].
Then, for any pi,j to exist, namely for (2.20) to hold in each instance, the
following condition must hold respectively:
G(bˆ(ξj)) > q
i,j > G(bˆ(ξi)). (2.21)
We refer to the vector points pi,j as double strategy fixed points, to emphasize
that they correspond to the group’s strategy profiles, such that the inspectees are
distributed between two available strategies.
Again, we present the detailed picture in the simplest case of three available
strategies generating increasingly illegal profits including compliance. Like above, in
Figures 2.4 and 2.5, we observe how the interplay of the key control parameters B
and f(·) affect the game dynamics. The general pattern is similar to Figures 2.2, 2.3.
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p0
p1
p2
(a) q12 > q02 > q01 > G(B)
p0
p1
p2
(b) q12>q02>G(B)>q01>G(bˆ(ξ1))
p0
p1
p2
p0,1
(c) q12>q02>G(B)≥G(bˆ(ξ1))>q01
p0
p1
p2 p0,2
(d) q12>G(B)>q02>q01>G(bˆ(ξ1))
p0
p1
p2
p0,1
p0,2
(e) q12>G(B)>q02>G(bˆ(ξ1))>q01
p0
p1
p2
p0,1
p0,2
(f) q12>G(B)≥G(bˆ(ξ1))>q02>q01
p0
p1
p2
p1,2
p0,2
(g) G(B)>q12>q02>q01>G(bˆ(ξ1))
p0
p1
p2
p0,1
p1,2
p0,2
(h) G(B)>q12>q02>G(bˆ(ξ1))>q01
p0
p1
p2
p0,1
p1,2
p0,2
(i) G(B)>q12>G(bˆ(ξ1))>q02>q01
p0
p1
p2
p0,1
p0,2
(j) G(B)≥G(bˆ(ξ1))>q12>q02>q01
Figure 2.4: Dynamics for the case of concave f(`) and three available
strategies/S = {0, 1, 2}
Initially, the pure strategy fixed point p2 appears to be asymptotically stable
(see Figures 2.4(a)–2.4(c), 2.5(a)), but gradually, either increasing B or toughening
up f(·), this unique asymptotically stable fixed point shifts towards compliance.
However, the shifting in this case takes place through double strategy fixed points, not
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through hyperplanes of fixed points. For a concave f(·), shifting towards compliance
occurs through the fixed point p0,2 living on the support of the two border strategies
(see Figures 2.4(d)–2.4(j)), while for a convex f(·), it occurs through the fixed points
p1,2, p0,1, living on the support of consecutive strategies (see Figures 2.5(b)–2.5(j)).
p0
p1
p2
(a) q01 > q02 > q12 > G(B)
p0
p1
p2
p1,2
(b) q01>q02>G(B)>q12>G(bˆ(ξ1))
p0
p1
p2
(c) q01>q02>G(B)≥G(bˆ(ξ1))>q12
p0
p1
p2
p1,2
p0,2
(d) q01>G(B)>q02>q12>G(bˆ(ξ1))
p0
p1
p2 p0,2
(e) q01>G(B)>q02>G(bˆ(ξ1))>q12
p0
p1
p2 p0,2
(f) q01>G(B)≥G(bˆ(ξ1))>q02>q12
p0
p1
p2
p1,2
p0,2
(g) G(B)>q01>q02>q12>G(bˆ(ξ1))
p0
p1
p2 p0,2
(h) G(B)>q01>q02>G(bˆ(ξ1))>q12
p0
p1
p2 p0,2
(i) G(B)>q01>G(bˆ(ξ1))>q02>q12
p0
p1
p2
p0,1
p0,2
(j) G(B)≥G(bˆ(ξ1))>q01>q02>q12
Figure 2.5: Dynamics for the case of convex f(`) and three available
strategies/S = {0, 1, 2}
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Proposition 2. Consider the fixed points given by Theorem 4. For a convex fine:
1. the set of double strategy fixed points contains at most one fixed point pi,i+1
living on the support of two consecutive strategies;
2. there is at most one pure strategy fixed point pi satisfying:
qi−1,i > G(bˆ(ξi)) > qi,i+1. (2.22)
Proof. We prove the two statements by contradiction.
1. Assume there are two double strategy fixed points, pi,i+1, pj,j+1, i, j ∈ S, such
that i < j, both living on the support of two consecutive strategies. In line with
Theorem 4, both of them should satisfy (2.19). However, since we consider a
convex fine, then from Lemma 1, it is also qi,i+1 > qj,j+1, and since it is j > i,
then from Assumption 1, it is also G
(
bˆ(ξj)
) ≥ G(bˆ(ξi+1)). Overall, we get that:
qi,i+1 > qj,j+1 > G(bˆ(ξj)) ≥ G(bˆ(ξi+1)),
which contradicts the initial assumption.
2. Assume there are two pure strategy fixed points, pi, pj , i, j ∈ S, such that
i 6= 0, i < j, both satisfying (2.22). However, since we consider a convex fine,
then from Lemma 1, it is also qi,i+1 ≥ qj−1,j , and since it is j > i, then from
Assumption 1, it is also G(bˆ(ξj)) ≥ G(bˆ(ξi)). Overall, we get that:
qi,i+1 ≥ qj−1,j > G(bˆ(ξj)) ≥ G(bˆ(ξi)),
which contradicts the initial assumption.
We generalize the findings discussed above on the occasion of Figures 2.4, 2.5,
into the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Let Assumption 1 hold. Consider the fixed points given by Theorem 4.
For a concave fine:
1. the pure strategy fixed point p0 is a source, thus unstable;
2. the pure strategy fixed points pi, i 6= 0, d, are saddles, thus unstable;
3. the double strategy fixed points pi,j 6= p0,d are saddles, thus unstable;
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4. the double strategy fixed point p0,d is asymptotically stable;
5. the pure strategy fixed point pd is asymptotically stable when p0,d does not exist;
otherwise, it is a source, thus unstable.
For a convex fine:
1. the pure strategy fixed point p0 is a source, thus unstable;
2. the double strategy fixed points pi,j , j 6= i+ 1, are saddles, thus unstable;
3. ∗ the double strategy fixed points pi,i+1 are asymptotically stable;
4. ∗ the pure strategy fixed points pi, i 6= 0, d, are saddles, thus unstable;
5. ∗ the pure strategy fixed point pd is a source, thus unstable.
∗ When no double strategy fixed point pi,i+1 living on the support of two consecutive
strategies exists, the pure strategy fixed point satisfying (2.22) is asymptotically stable.
Proof. See Section 2.6.
2.4 Continuous Strategy Setting
The discrete strategy setting is our first approach towards introducing multiple levels
of violation available for the inspectees. It is an easier framework to work with
for our analytic purposes, and it is more appropriate to depict certain applications.
For example, in the tax inspections regime, the tax payers can be thought of as
evading taxes only in discrete amounts (this is the case in real life). However, in the
general crime control regime, the intensity of criminal activity should be treated as
a continuous variable. Therefore, the continuous strategy setting is regarded as the
natural extension of the discrete setting that captures the general picture.
We consider the scenario where the inspectees choose their extend of compli-
ance within an infinite bounded set of strategies, Λ = [0, d], generating increasingly
illegal profits. Here, we identify the inspectees’ available strategies with the cor-
responding illegal profits that they generate to an undetected violator. We retain
the initially introduced framework (i.e., the myopic hypothesis, the best response
principle, etc.), adjusting our assumptions and our analysis to the continuous local
strategy space when needed. Our intention is to extend the findings of Section 2.3.
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The population’s state space ΛN is the set of sequences x = (`1, . . . , `N ),
where `n ∈ Λ is the n-th inspectee’s strategy. This can be naturally identified with
the set MN consisting of the normalized sums of N Dirac measures (δ`1 +· · ·+δ`N )/N .
Let the set of probability measures on Λ be M(Λ). We rewrite the inspectee’s
payoff function (2.5), playing for illegal profit ` ∈ Λ against inspector’s invested
budget b in the form:
Π(`, b) = r +
(
1−G(b)) · `−G(b) · f(`). (2.23)
Let us introduce the notation δx for the sum δ`1 + · · ·+ δ`N . We rewrite the
inspector’s payoff function (2.6) in the form:
Π(δx/N, b,N) = −b+N ·G(b) · 〈f, δx/N〉 · κ
N
−N · (1−G(b)) · 〈`, δx/N〉 · κ
N
, (2.24)
where for the positive scaling constant, without loss of generality, we set κ = 1.
Recall the argument we introduced in Section 2.3.2 regarding the inspector’s
subjective evaluation, which leads to expressions (2.6) and (2.24).
It is rigorously proven in Kolokoltsov [2014] that, given that the initial
distribution δx/N converges to a certain measure µ ∈M(Λ) as N →∞, the group’s
strategy profile evolution under the inspector’s optimum pressure bˆ corresponds to
the deterministic evolution on M(Λ) solving the kinetic equation ∀A ⊆ Λ:
µ˙t(A) = ω ·
∫
z∈A
∫
y∈Λ
[
Π(z, bˆ)−Π(y, bˆ)]µt(dy)µt(dz), (2.25)
or equivalently in the weak form:
d
dt
〈g(·), µt〉 = ω ·
∫
Λ2
g(z) · [Π(z, bˆ)−Π(y, bˆ)]µt(dy)µt(dz). (2.26)
Recall that Assumption 1 ensures that bˆ is well defined. Furthermore, notice
that notation ¯`, f¯ , ξ¯ introduced in Section 2.3 stands here for the expected values
〈`, µ〉, 〈f, µ〉, 〈ξ, µ〉, ∀µ ∈M(Λ), respectively, where f = f(`) and ξ = ξ(`) = `+ f(`).
Using this inner product notation and substituting (2.23) into (2.25), the
kinetic equation can be written in a symbolic form:
µ˙t(dz) = ω · µt(dz) ·
[
z −G(bˆ) · (z + f(z)) + 〈G(bˆ) · (f(·) + ·)− ·, µt〉
]
. (2.27)
One can think of (2.25) and (2.27) as the continuous local strategy space
equivalents of equations (2.9) and (2.12).
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Proposition 3. A (non-negative) probability measure µ ∈M(Λ) is a singular point
of (2.25), namely, it satisfies:∫
z∈A
∫
y∈Λ
[
Π(z, bˆ)−Π(y, bˆ)]µt(dy)µt(dz) = 0, (2.28)
∀A ⊆ Λ, if and only if the inspectees’ payoff (2.23) is constant on the support of µ.
Since M(Λ) is the set of probability laws on Λ, then supp(µ) cannot be an empty set.
Proof. We use the inner product notation,
∫
y∈Λ Π(y, bˆ(µt))µt(dy) = 〈Π(·, bˆ), µt〉, to
rewrite (2.28) in the equivalent form:∫
z∈A
(
Π(z, bˆ)− 〈Π(·, bˆ), µt〉
)
µt(dz) = 0, (2.29)
and the result follows, since (2.29) holds when Π(z, bˆ) = 〈Π(·, bˆ), µt〉 for any z ∈ A.
2.4.1 Linear Fine
We consider a linear fine f(`) = σ · `, ` ∈ Λ, and we extend the definitions (2.11),
(2.15) and (2.16) to the continuous strategy setting.
Theorem 6. Let Assumption 1 hold. Every Dirac measure δz, ∀z ∈ Λ is a fixed
point of (2.25). Moreover:
1. If G(bˆ(d)) > 11+σ , there is additionally a unique hyperplane of fixed points:
Θ =
{
µθ ∈M(Λ) | ∃! ¯`∈ (0,min[`c, d]) : 〈`, µθ〉 = ¯` & G(bˆ(¯`)) = 1
1 + σ
}
,
2. If G(bˆ(d)) = 11+σ and d > `c, there are additionally infinitely many hyperplanes
of fixed points:
Φ =
{
µφ ∈M(Λ) | ∀ ¯`∈ [`c, d] : 〈`, µφ〉 = ¯` & G(bˆ(¯`)) = 1
1 + σ
}
.
Proof. Every Dirac measure δz for arbitrary z ∈ Λ satisfies (2.28), since by definition
it is 〈Π(·, bˆ), δz〉 = Π(z, bˆ).
Furthermore, Assumption 1 ensures that bˆ : Λ 7→ [0, bˆ(d)] is a continuous, non-
decreasing, surjective function. In particular, G(·) is strictly increasing in bˆ ∈ [0, B],
and bˆ(·) is strictly increasing in ¯`∈ [0,min[`c, d]]. Therefore:
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1. When G(bˆ(d)) > 11+σ , there is a unique average value
¯`∈ (0,min[`c, d]) satisfy-
ing G(bˆ(¯`)) = 11+σ . This unique
¯` is generated by infinitely many probability
measures, µθ such that 〈`, µθ〉 = ¯`, forming a hyperplane of points in M(Λ)
satisfying (2.25).
2. When G(bˆ(d)) = 11+σ , and d > `c, every average value
¯` ∈ [`c, d] satisfies
G(bˆ(¯`)) = 11+σ . Each one of these infinitely many
¯` is generated by infinitely
many probability measures, µφ such that 〈`, µφ〉 = ¯`, forming infinitely many
hyperplanes of points satisfying (2.25).
We refer to the points δz as pure strategy fixed points, to emphasize that they
correspond to the group’s strategy profiles, such that every inspectee plays the same
strategy z. Accordingly, we refer to the points µθ, µφ as mixed strategy fixed points.
Theorem 7. Let Assumption 1 hold. Consider the fixed points given by Theorem 6.
For a linear fine:
1. the pure strategy fixed points δz /∈ Θ,Φ, z ∈ Λ : z 6= d, are unstable;
2. the pure strategy fixed point δd is asymptotically stable on the topology of the
total variation norm, when Φ = Θ = ∅; otherwise, it is unstable;
3. the mixed strategy fixed points µθ, µφ are stable.
Proof. See Section 2.6.
2.4.2 Convex/Concave Fine
Let us extend definitions (2.11) and (2.17) to the continuous strategy setting.
For every x, y ∈ Λ : x < y, let us also introduce the auxiliary parameter:
qx,y =
x− y
x− y + f(x)− f(y) . (2.30)
Lemma 2. For a convex fine, qx,y is strictly decreasing in x for constant y (or vice
versa), while for a concave fine, qx,y is strictly increasing in x for constant y (or vice
versa). In addition, for a convex fine, qx,y is strictly decreasing in x, y for constant
(y−x), while for a concave fine, qx,y is strictly increasing in x, y for constant (y−x).
Draft of 9:20 pm, Sunday, March 25, 2018 29
Theorem 8. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, every Dirac measure δz, ∀z ∈ Λ, is
a fixed point of (2.25). Moreover, every normalized sum of two Dirac measures
µx,y = ax · δx + ay · δy,∀x, y ∈ Λ : x < y, ax + ay = 1, is a fixed point of (2.25),
uniquely defined for each pair of strategies x, y; µx,y exist on condition that they
satisfy respectively:
G(bˆ(ξ(y))) > qx,y > G(bˆ(ξ(x))). (2.31)
Proof. Every Dirac measure δz, for arbitrary z ∈ Λ, satisfies (2.28), since by definition,
it is 〈Π(·, bˆ), δz〉 = Π(z, bˆ).
Consider a probability measure µ∗ ∈ M(Λ) satisfying (2.28), such that
〈`, µ∗〉 = `∗, 〈f, µ∗〉 = f∗, 〈ξ, µ∗〉 = ξ∗, µ∗ 6= δz. Then, from Proposition 3, µ∗ should
satisfy Π(x, bˆ) = Π(y, bˆ) for every pair of x, y ∈ supp(µ∗), namely the fraction qx,y
should be constant ∀x, y ∈ supp(µ∗) and equal to G(bˆ(ξ∗)).
According to Lemma 2, this is possible only when the support of µ∗ contains
no more than two elements, namely when it is equivalent to the normalised sum of two
Dirac measures, such that µ∗ = µx,y = ax · δx + ay · δy, ∀x, y ∈ Λ : x < y, ax + ay = 1.
Such a probability measure satisfies:
G(bˆ(ξx,y)) = q
x,y, (2.32)
where ξx,y = 〈ξ, ax · δx + ay · δy〉 = ax · (x+ f(x)) + ay · (y + f(y)).
In addition, Assumption 1 ensures that bˆ : [0, ξ(d)] 7→ [0, bˆ(ξ(d))] is a continu-
ous, surjective, non-decreasing function. Particularly, G(·) is strictly increasing in
bˆ ∈ [0, B], and bˆ(·) is strictly increasing in ξ¯ ∈ [0,min[ξ(c), ξ(d)]]. Therefore, for any
µx,y to exist, namely for (2.32) to hold in each instance, the following condition must
hold respectively:
G(bˆ(ξ(y))) > qx,y > G(bˆ(ξ(x))). (2.33)
We refer to the points µx,y as double strategy fixed points, since they cor-
respond to the group’s strategy profiles such that the inspectees are distributed
between two available strategies.
Theorem 9. Let Assumption 1 hold. Consider the fixed points given by Theorem 8.
Then, for a concave fine:
1. the pure strategy fixed points δz, z 6= d are unstable;
2. the double strategy fixed points µx,y 6= µ0,d are unstable;
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3. the double strategy fixed point µ0,d is asymptotically stable;
4. the pure strategy fixed point δd is asymptotically stable on the topology of the
total variation norm, when µ0,d does not exist; otherwise, it is unstable.
Proof. See Section 2.6.
2.5 Fixed Points and Nash Equilibria
So far, we have deduced and analysed the dynamics governing the deterministic
evolution of the multi-player system we have introduced (assuming the myopic
hypothesis for an infinitely large population of indistinguishable, interacting agents).
Our intention now is to provide a game-theoretic interpretation of the fixed points
we have identified. We work in the context of the discrete strategy setting. The
extension to the continuous strategy setting is straightforward.
Let us consider the game ΩN involving a finite number of N + 1 players
(N inspectees, one inspector). When the inspector chooses to play strategy b ∈ B
and each of the N inspectees chooses to play the same strategy i ∈ S, then the
inspector receives the payoff ΠI(b, x,N), and each inspectee receives the payoff Πi(b).
Note that the inspectees’ collective strategy profile can be thought of as the collection
of relative occupation frequencies, x = (xi).
One then defines an -approximate Nash equilibrium of ΩN as a profile of
strategies (bˆ(xN ), xN ), such that:
bˆ(xN ) = argmax ΠI(b, xN , N), (2.34)
and for any pair of strategies i, j ∈ {0, . . . , d}, the inequality:
Πj(bˆ(xN − ei/N + ej/N)) ≤ Πi(bˆ(xN )), (2.35)
holds up to an additive correction term not exceeding , where ei denote the standard
basis in Rd.
It turns out that the fixed points identified in Section 2.3 for the discrete
strategy setting (and by extension in Section 2.4 for the continuous strategy setting)
describe approximate Nash equilibria of ΩN . We state here the relevant result without
a proof. A rigorous discussion can be found in Kolokoltsov [2014]. Recall that for a
sufficiently large population N (formally valid for N →∞), we can approximate the
relative occupation frequencies xi with the probabilities ρi obeying (2.12).
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Proposition 4. Under suitable continuity assumptions on Πi and ΠI :
1. any limit point of any sequence xN , such that (bˆ(xN ), xN ) is a Nash equilibrium
of ΩN , is a fixed point of the deterministic evolution (2.12);
2. for any fixed point x of (2.12), there exists a 1/N−Nash equilibrium (bˆ(xN ), xN )
of ΩN , such that the difference of any pair of coordinates of xN , x does not
exceed 1/N in magnitude.
The above result provides a game-theoretic interpretation of the fixed points
that were identified by Theorems 2, 4, 6 and 8, independent of the myopic hypothesis.
Moreover, it naturally raises the question of which equilibria can be chosen by the
agents in the long run. The fixed points stability analysis performed in Sections
2.3 and 2.4 aims to investigate this issue. Furthermore, Proposition 4 states, in
simple words, that our analysis and our results are also valid for a finite population
of inspectees (recall our initial assumption for an infinitely large N), with precision
that is inversely proportional to the size of N .
2.6 Proofs
We make use of the Hartman-Grobman theorem, stating that the local phase portrait
near a hyperbolic fixed point is topologically equivalent to the phase portrait of the
linearisation, see, e.g., Strogatz [2014], namely that the stability of a hyperbolic fixed
point is preserved under the transition from the linear to the non-linear system. For
the non-hyperbolic fixed points we resort to Liapunov’s method, see, e.g., Jordan
and Smith [2007]. Recall that a fixed point is hyperbolic if all the eigenvalues of
the linearisation evaluated at this point have non-zero real parts. Such a point is
asymptotically stable if and only if all the eigenvalues have strictly negative real
part, while it is unstable (either a source or a saddle) when at least one has strictly
positive real part.
Proof of Theorem 3
We rewrite (2.12) in the equivalent form, for i ∈ S : i 6= j, and arbitrary j ∈ S:
ρ˙i(t) = ρi(t) ·
(
1− (1 + σ) ·G(bˆ)) · (`i − `j +∑
n6=j
ρn · (`j − `n)
)
. (2.36)
The linearization of (2.36) around a pure strategy fixed point pj , can be
written in the matrix form:
p˙(t) = A · p(t) (2.37)
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where A is a d × d diagonal matrix, with main diagonal entries, that is, with
eigenvalues:
λi|pj =
(
1− (1 + σ) ·G(bˆ(`j))
) · (`i − `j). (2.38)
(i) For the pure strategy fixed point p0 we get:
λi|p0 = `i, (2.39)
that is strictly positive ∀ i ∈ S : i 6= 0. Then p0 is a source.
(ii) For the pure strategy fixed point pd we get:
λi|pd = (`i − `d) ·
(
1− (1 + σ) ·G(bˆ(`d))
)
, (2.40)
that is strictly negative ∀ i ∈ S : i 6= d when G(bˆ(`d)) < 11+σ ⇔ Θ = Φ = ∅.
Then pd is asymptotically stable.
Otherwise, (2.40) is strictly positive, and pd is a source.
(iii) For the pure strategy fixed points pj , ∀ j ∈ S : j 6= 0, d, (2.38) changes sign
between `j < `i and `j > `i, when i ∈ S : i 6= j. Then pj are saddles.
(iv) For the non-isolated, non-hyperbolic mixed strategy fixed points pθ, pφ we resort
to Liapunov’s method. In particular, we consider the real valued Liapunov
function V ∈ C1(Σd+1):
V (p) =
(
1− (1 + σ) ·G(bˆ))2. (2.41)
Differentiating with respect to time, we get:
V˙ (p) = −(1 + σ) · (1− (1 + σ) ·G(bˆ)) · ∂G
∂bˆ
· ∂bˆ
∂ ¯`
· ∂
¯`
∂t
. (2.42)
From Assumption 1, G(·) is strictly increasing in bˆ ∈ [0, B], and bˆ(·) is strictly
increasing in ¯`∈ [0,min[`c, `d]]. Additionally, differentiating (2.36) with respect
to time we get:
d¯`
dt
=
(
1− (1 + σ) ·G(bˆ(¯`))) · (〈`, p〉2 − 〈`2, p〉). (2.43)
Overall, we have that V (pθ) = 0, V (p) > 0 if p 6= pθ, and V˙ (p) ≤ 0 for all
p ∈ Σd+1 (respectively for pφ and p 6= pφ). Therefore, according to Liapunov’s
Theorem, pθ,pφ are stable.
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Proof of Theorem 5
We rewrite (2.12) in the equivalent form, i ∈ S : i 6= d:
ρ˙i(t) = gi(p) =
(
(`i − `d + fi − fd) · (qi,d −G(bˆ))−
∑
j 6=d
(`j − `d + fj − fd)
×(qj,d −G(bˆ)) · ρj
) · ρi. (2.44)
Around an arbitrary fixed point p∗ = (ρ∗i ), the nonlinear system (2.44) is
approximated by:
ρ˙i(t) =
∑
l 6=d
∂gi(p)
∂ρκ
|p=p∗ · (ρκ − ρ∗κ), (2.45)
which is a linear system with coefficient matrix A = (aiκ), κ ∈ S : κ 6= d, with:
aiκ :=
∂gi(p)
∂ρκ
|p=p∗ =
(−(`κ − `d + fκ − fd) · (qκ,d −G(bˆ(ξ∗))
+
(
`d − `i + fd − fi +
∑
j 6=d
(`j − `d + fj − fd) · ρ∗j
) · ∂G(bˆ(ξ¯))
∂ρκ
|ξ¯=ξ∗
) · ρ∗i
+δiκ ·
(
(`d − `i + fd − fi) · (G(bˆ(ξ∗))− qi,d) +
∑
j 6=d
(`j − `d + fj − fd)
×(G(bˆ(ξ∗))− qj,d) · ρ∗i
)
,
(2.46)
where ξ∗ = 〈ξ, p∗〉. This is the Jacobian Matrix of (2.44) at an arbitrary fixed point
p∗ = (ρ∗i ). We use the characteristic equation:
det(A− λ · I) = 0,
to identify the eigenvalues of matrix A for every fixed point.
Let us introduce the notation Ei,j for the elementary matrix corresponding
to the row/column operation of swapping rows/columns i j . The inverse matrix
of Ei,j is itself, namely it is E
−1
i,j = Ei,j .
For a pure strategy fixed point pl, l ∈ S : l 6= 1, first swapping rows 1 l of
A, and then swapping columns 1 l of the resulting matrix, we obtain the upper
triangular matrix:
B = E
−1
1,l ·A · E1,l. (2.47)
For l = 1, the Jacobian matrix A is already an upper triangular matrix.
Matrices A and B are similar, that it, they have the same characteristic polynomial
and thus the same eigenvalues. Note that the eigenvalues of an upper triangular
matrix are precisely its diagonal elements.
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Consequently, the eigenvalues of A at a pure strategy fixed point pl, l ∈ S,
are given by:
λi|pl = (`l−`i+fl−fi)·(G(bˆ(ξl))−qi,l)+δil ·(`i−`d+fi−fd)·(G(bˆ(ξl))−qi,d). (2.48)
For a double strategy fixed point pm,n, m,n ∈ S : m < n,m 6= 1, 2, n 6= 2,
swapping rows 1 m of A, and then swapping in order rows 2 n, columns 1 m,
columns 2 n, we obtain the matrix:
C = (E1,m · E2,n)−1 ·A · E1,m · E2,n, (2.49)
where we have used the inverse matrix product identity.
For (m,n) = (1, 2) the Jacobian matrix A has already the form of C. For
m = 1, n 6= 2 we need to swap only the n row, n column. Respectively for m = 2.
Matrices A and C are similar. The characteristic polynomial of C, and thus of A, is:
(amm − λ) · det
(
(ciκ)i,κ 6=1 − λ · I
)
+ (amn − λ) · det
(
(ciκ)i 6=1,κ6=2 − λ · I
)
= (amm − λ) ·
∏
i 6=m
(aii − λ) + (amn − λ) · (anm − λ) ·
∏
i 6=m,n
(aii − λ)
=
(
(amm − λ) · (ann − λ) + (amn − λ) · (anm − λ)
) · ∏
i 6=m,n
(aii − λ)
= 0,
(2.50)
where (ciκ)i,κ 6=1 and (ciκ)i 6=1,κ6=2 are upper triangular matrices.
Thus, the eigenvalues of A at a double strategy fixed point pm,n,m, n ∈ S :
m < n, are given by:
λi|pm,n = (`m − `i + fm − fi) · (G(bˆ(ξm,n))− qi,m) + (δin · ρn + δim · ρm)
×((`i − `d + fi − fd) · (G(bˆ(ξm,n))− qi,d)
+(ρn · (`n − `m + fn − fm) + `m − `i + fm − fi) · ∂G(bˆ(ξ¯))
∂ρi
|ξ¯=ξm,n
)
.
(2.51)
Concave Fine;
(i) For the pure strategy fixed point p0, we get form (2.48):
λi|p0 = `i + δi0 · (`d − `i), (2.52)
that is strictly positive ∀ i ∈ S : i 6= d. Then p0 is a source.
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(ii) For the pure strategy fixed points pl, l 6= 0, d, say it is G(bˆ(ξl)) > qi,l (or
G(bˆ(ξl)) < q
i,l), ∀ i ∈ S : i 6= d; then (2.48) changes sign between i < l
and i > l. Alternatively, say there is some w such that G(bˆ(ξl)) > q
w,l,
G(bˆ(ξl)) < q
w+1,l; then (2.48) indicatively changes sign between i < w < l and
w < i < l (or between l < i < w and l < w < i). Then pl, l 6= 0, d, are saddles.
(iii) For the double strategy fixed points pm,n 6= p0,d, (2.51) changes sign, indica-
tively between i > n > m and n > i > m (since qi,m is strictly increasing in i).
Then pm,n 6= p0,d are saddles.
(iv) For the double strategy fixed point p0,d, we get from (2.51):
λi|p0,d = −(`i + fi) · (G(bˆ(ξ0,d))− q0,i) + δi0 · ρ0 ·
(
(`i − `d + fi − fd)
×(G(bˆ(ξ0,d))− qi,d) + (ρd · (`d + fd)− `i − fi) · ∂G(bˆ(ξ¯))
∂ρi
|ξ¯=ξ0,d
)
,
(2.53)
that is strictly negative ∀ i ∈ S : i 6= d (since G(bˆ(ξ0,d)) = q0,d, q0,i is strictly
increasing in i). Then p0,d is asymptotically stable.
(v) For the pure strategy fixed point pd, we get from (2.48):
λi|pd = (`d − `i + fd − fi) · (G(bˆ(ξd))− qi,d), (2.54)
that is strictly negative ∀i ∈ S : i 6= d when p0,d does not exist, namely when
q0,d > G(bˆ(ξd)). Then pd is asymptotically stable.
Otherwise, it is strictly positive ∀i ∈ S : i 6= d, that is, pd is a source.
Convex Fine;
(i) For the pure strategy fixed point p0, we get from (2.48):
λi|p0 = `i + δi0 · (`d − `i), (2.55)
that is strictly positive ∀i ∈ S : i 6= d. Then p0 is a source.
(ii) For the double strategy fixed points pm,n, n 6= m + 1, (2.51) changes sign,
indicatively between i > n > m and n > i > m (since qi,m is strictly decreasing
in i). Then pm,n are saddles.
(iii) For the double strategy fixed points pj,j+1, (2.51) is strictly negative ∀i ∈ S :
i 6= d (since G(bˆ(ξj,j+1)) = qj,j+1, qi,j is strictly decreasing in i). Then pj,j+1
is asymptotically stable.
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(iv) For the pure strategy fixed points pl, l 6= 0, d, (2.48) is strictly negative ∀i ∈ S :
i 6= d when pl satisfies (2.22), namely when ql−1,l > G(bˆ(ξl)) > ql,l+1. Then pl
is asymptotically stable.
Otherwise (2.48) changes sign (see part (ii) of the proof for a concave fine),
that is, pj is a saddle.
(v) For the pure strategy fixed point pd, we get from (2.48):
λi|pd = (`d − `i + fd − fi) · (G(bˆ(ξd))− qi,d), (2.56)
that is strictly negative ∀i ∈ S : i 6= d when pd satisfies (2.22), namely when
qd−1,d > G(bˆ(ξd)). Then pd is asymptotically stable.
Otherwise, it is strictly positive ∀i ∈ S : i 6= d, that is, pd is a source.
Proof of Theorem 7
(i) From the proof of Theorem (3), we have seen that the pure strategy fixed
points δz /∈ Θ,Φ, z ∈ Λ : z 6= d, have at least one unstable trajectory.
(ii) For the pure strategy fixed point δd, consider the real valued (Liapunov)
function L1 ∈ C1(E), where E is an open subset of M(Λ), with radius r < 2
and center δd, such that:
L1(µ) = d− 〈`, µ〉. (2.57)
The total variation distance between any two Dirac measures δx, δy ∈M(Λ) is:
dTV (δx − δy) = sup
|f |≤1
∫
f(z)(δx − δy)dz = 2. (2.58)
No Dirac measures are contained in E. Using variational derivatives, we get:
L˙1(µ) =
(
1− (1 + σ) ·G(bˆ(¯`))) · (〈`, µ〉2 − 〈`2, µ〉). (2.59)
When Φ = Θ = ∅ ⇔ G(bˆ(d)) < 11+σ , we have that L1(δd) = 0, L1(µ) > 0
if µ 6= δd, and L˙1(µ) < 0 for all µ ∈ E\δd. Then, according to Liapunov’s
Theorem, δd is asymptotically stable.
(iii) For the mixed strategy fixed points µθ, µφ, take the real valued (Liapunov)
function L2 ∈ C1(M(Λ))
L2(µ) =
(
1− (1 + σ) ·G(bˆ(¯`)))2. (2.60)
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Using variational derivatives, we get:
L˙2(µ) = 2 · (1 + σ) · L2(µ) · dG
dbˆ
· dbˆ
d¯`
· (〈`, µ〉2 − 〈`2, µ〉). (2.61)
From Assumption 1, G(·) is strictly increasing in bˆ ∈ [0, B], and bˆ(·) is strictly
increasing in ¯`∈ [0,min[`c, d]]. Hence, we have that L2(µθ) = 0, L2(µ) > 0 if
µ 6= µθ, and L˙2(µ) ≤ 0 for all µ ∈M(Λ) (respectively for µφ). Then, according
to Liapunov’s theorem, µθ, µφ are stable.
Proof of Theorem 9
(i)-(ii) From the proof of Theorem (5), we have seen that the pure strategy fixed
points δz, z 6= d, and the double strategy fixed points µx,y 6= µ0,d, have at least
one unstable trajectory.
(iii) For the mixed strategy fixed point µ0,d, consider the real valued (Liapunov)
function U1 ∈ C1(E) where E is an open subset of M(Λ), with radius r < 2
and center µ0,d:
U1(µ) =
(
q0,d −G(bˆ(ξ¯)))2. (2.62)
Using variational derivatives we get:
U˙1(µ) = −2 · dG
dbˆ
· dbˆ
dξ¯
· (q0,d −G(bˆ(ξ¯))) · (〈`2, µ〉 − 〈`, µ〉2 + 〈` · f(`), µ〉
−〈`, µ〉 · 〈f(`), µ〉 −G(bˆ(ξ¯)) · (〈`2, µ〉 − 〈`, µ〉2 + 〈f(`)2, µ〉 − 〈f(`), µ〉2
+2 · (〈` · f(`), µ〉 − 〈`, µ〉 · 〈f(`), µ〉))).
(2.63)
Consider a small deviation from µ0,d:
ν = (1− ) · (a0 · δ0 + ad · δd) +  · µ, (2.64)
where  is small, and ‖µ‖ = 1. In first order approximation, one can show that:
〈`2, ν〉 − 〈`, ν〉2 + 〈` · f(`), ν〉 − 〈`, ν〉 · 〈f(`), ν〉
〈`2, ν〉 − 〈`, ν〉2 + 〈f(`)2, ν〉 − 〈f(`), ν〉2 + 2 · (〈` · f(`), ν〉 − 〈`, ν〉 · 〈f(`), ν〉)
> (<)q0,d
⇒ 〈(f(d) · `− d · f(`)) · (`− ad + f(`)− ad · f(d)), µ〉 > (<)0,
(2.65)
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holds, when:
G
(
bˆ
(
ad · (d+ f(d)) +  · 〈`+ f(`)− ad · (d+ f(d))〉
))
> (<)q0,d
⇔ `+ f(`)− ad · (d+ f(d)) > (<)0,
(2.66)
where:
〈ξ, ν〉 = ad · (d+ f(d)) +  · 〈`+ f(`)− ad · (d+ f(d))〉. (2.67)
For a concave fine, it is:
f(d) · `− d · f(`) < 0, (2.68)
and from Assumption 1, G(·) is strictly increasing in bˆ, and bˆ(·) is strictly
increasing in ¯`. Then, overall we have that U1(µ0,d) = 0, U1(µ) > 0 if µ 6= µ0,d,
and U˙1(ν) < 0, for any small deviation from µ0,d. Thus, according to Liapunov’s
theorem µ0,d is asymptotically stable.
(iv) For the pure strategy fixed point δd, consider the real valued (Liapunov)
function U2 ∈ C1(E), where E is an open subset of M(Λ), with radius r < 2
and center δd (so that E does not contain any other dirac measures):
U2(µ) = d− 〈`, µ〉. (2.69)
Using variational derivatives we get:
U˙2(µ) = −
(〈`2, µ〉 − 〈`, µ〉2 −G(bˆ(ξ¯)) · (〈`2, µ〉 − 〈`, µ〉2
+〈` · f(`), µ〉 − 〈`, µ〉 · 〈f(`), µ〉)). (2.70)
When µ0,d does not exist, namely when
d
d+f(d) > G(bˆ(ξ(d))), take a small
deviation from δd:
ν = (1− ) · δd +  · µ, (2.71)
where  is small, and ‖µ‖ = 1. In first order approximation, one can show that:
〈`2, ν〉 − 〈`, ν〉2
〈`2, ν〉 − 〈`, ν〉2 + 〈` · f(`), ν〉 − 〈`, ν〉 · 〈f(`), ν〉 >
d
d+ f(d)
⇒ 〈(`− d) · (` · f(d)− d · f(`)), µ〉 > 0,
(2.72)
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holds, since for a concave fine it is:
` · f(d)− d · f(`) < 0, (2.73)
and, for any ξ¯ < ξ(d) it is:
G(bˆ(ξ¯)) < G(bˆ(ξ(d))). (2.74)
Then, overall we have that U2(δd) = 0, U2(µ) > 0 if µ 6= δd, and U˙2(ν) < 0 for
any small deviation from δd within E. Thus, according to Liapunov’s theorem,
δd is asymptotically stable.
Chapter 3
Evolutionary, Mean-Field and
Pressure-Resistance Game
Modelling of Networks Security
3.1 Introduction
The issue of social security and crime prevention dominantly concerns the modern
societies. In the traditional terrain of counter-terrorism, corruption and tax evasion,
the corresponding authorities in charge struggle to deal with large populations of
increasingly informed violating individuals (this term will be used interchangeably
with the terms agents or small players). Reversely, in the recently emerging field
of cyber-security, large groups of individuals aim to defend their private computers
against a lurking cyber-criminal (bot-net defence). Similar reasoning can be asserted
for the citizens of a large city defending against a biological weapon (bio-terrorism).
The rapid advance in the means and the speed of interaction, communication and
exchange of information has established the individuals’ social network as a decisive
parameter of their strategic decision making in the above and similar instances.
Here we consider agents who are organized in specific social or phenotypic (or even
geographical), and behavioural network structures. The central focus of this chapter
is to investigate the evolution of the complex process where a (very) large number of
interacting individuals, susceptible to engage in or be affected by criminal behaviour,
decide their strategies subject to a benevolent, or respectively to a malicious, major
player’s (this term will be used interchangeably with the term principal) pressure, to
their individual optimization criterion, and to their (social) environment’s influence.
In the real life scenaria we aim to capture with our approach, it is natural then
40
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to distinguish two main dimensions of (network) structure. The first dimension refers
to the individuals’ objective distribution among different levels of social, bureaucratic,
or phenotypic hierarchy, or to their geographical distribution, in general to any
finite partition according to their independent characteristics. One can think for
example of tax payers of different bands, employees of different grades, or infected
computers/individuals of different degrees. The second dimension refers to the agents’
distribution among different types of strategy or behaviour, subject (mainly) to the
agents’ individual control; say for example the level of tax evasion in the field of
inspection games, the extent of bribery acceptance in the field of corruption games,
or the level of defence against terrorist activity or a malware in the fields of counter
terrorism and cyber-security respectively.
Note that our game theoretic approach is developed under the basic idea of a
very large number of non-cooperative, interacting agents playing against (i.e under
the pressure of) a single major player. In principle, our model belongs to the class of
non-linear Markov games, see, e.g., Kolokoltsov [2010], combining under an extended
scheme the pressure-resistance, the evolutionary, and the mean-field game approach.
The pressure-resistance terminology was introduced in Kolokoltsov [2014],
where ideas captured from evolutionary game theory were extended, including the
pressure of a major player on a large group of interacting small players. Here,
the pressure-resistance game component refers to the principal’s interference that
generates transitions solely on the first dimension of structure (e.g. a benevolent
director able to promote or downgrade interacting bureaucrats, computers and
individuals getting infected or recovering subject to a cyber-criminal’s and a bio-
terrorist’s activity respectively). This approach of major and minor players has also
been considered for the analysis of mean-field type models, see, e.g., Bensoussan,
Chau and Yam [2016], Carmona and Zhu [2016], Huang [2010].
The evolutionary game component refers to the agents’ pairwise interactions,
with particular focus on the effect of the established social norms, potentially
generating transitions on both dimensions of structure. For a general survey on
the literature of population dynamics applications on game theory, that is, on
evolutionary game theory, see, e.g., Gintis [2000], Hofbauer and Sigmund [2003],
Samuelson [2002], Smith [1988], Szabo´ and Fath [2007], Taylor et al. [2004], Weibull
[1997]. See also Friedman [1991, 1998] for specific application in economics.
The mean-field game (MFG) component refers to the agents’ individual opti-
mization controlled by their strategic position on the second dimension of structure,
taking into account the entire population’s behaviour. This element of ‘globally’
rational optimization introduces an additional level of complexity compared to Kat-
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sikas, Kolokoltsov and Yang [2016], Kolokoltsov [2014], where optimization strictly
upon imitation of successful strategies on the basis of binary comparison of payoffs
was considered (purely evolutionary approach). MFGs were introduced by Larsy
and Lions [2007], by analogy with the mean-field theory in statistical mechanics,
and were also introduced independently by Huang, Malham and Caines [2006] as
large population stochastic dynamic games. In principle, they represent a natural
extension of earlier work in the economics literature under the assumption of infinite
number of players, see, e.g. Aumann [1964], Dubey, Mas-Colell and Shubik [1980]
for static games, Bergin and Bernhardt [1992], Jovanovic and Rosenthal [1988] for
dynamic games. The literature on MFGs is growing fast, see, e.g., Bensoussan,
Frehse and Yam [2013], Caines [2013], Cardaliaguet [2010], Carmona and Delarue
[2013], Gomes and Saude [2014], Tembine et al. [2009] for a general survey.
Here we shall work in three asymptotic regimes, that is, we shall consider
fast execution of the agents’ personal decisions, weak binary interactions, and small
discounting in time. The need to introduce this ternary asymptotic approach
is revealed from the analysis of a similar setting conducted in Kolokoltsov and
Bensoussan [2016], where the distribution of infection in a computers network with a
malicious software controlled by a cyber-criminal was described by a stationary MFG
model with four states. Whilst the three states model describing the distribution of
corruption in a population of bureaucrats under the pressure of a benevolent principal
that was studied in Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev [2015], is solved explicitly without
any asymptotic simplifications, the introduction of a fourth state in Kolokoltsov and
Bensoussan [2016] already increases the complexity significantly, such that the need
to consider (though not as strongly as we do here) the assumption of large λ (fast
decisions execution) is critical to obtain descent solutions.
Similarly, for the even more complex n×m states model we introduce here,
the need to consider the three asymptotic regimes mentioned above becomes obvious.
In principle, even without working in these asymptotic regimes one can sometimes
obtain explicit but extremely lengthy formulas, not revealing any clearer insights. But
also form a practical point of view our asymptotic approach has clear interpretation.
Indicatively, an infinitely large transition rate λ implies the natural process of
immediate execution of personal decisions as long as they have already been taken,
while a vanishingly small discounting δdis implies a short planning horizon. Both of
the models studied in Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev [2015], Kolokoltsov and Bensoussan
[2016], and our extended approach here, belong to the category of finite state space
mean-field games that were initially considered in Gomes, Mohr and Souza [2010,
2013]. See also Gomes, Velho and Wolfram [2014] for socio-economic applications.
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Added to the applications on corruption, and cyber-security, here we introduce
the bio-terrorism interpretation, that is, the defence of a population against a
biological weapon. The implementation of game theoretic methods to the analysis of
terrorism has been vastly developed ever since the 1980s, with game theory allowing
the investigation of different instances of strategic interaction (e.g. terrorists vs
government, terrorists vs terrorists, terrorists for sponsors, terrorists for supporters),
see, e.g., Arce, Daniel and Sandler [2005], Sandler and Arce [2007], Sandler and
Siqueira [2009]. The pairing we capture here is civilians vs a bio-terrorist.
We organize Chapter 3 as follows. In Section 3.2 we specify explicitly the
time-dependent and stationary MFG consistency problems. In Section 3.3 we solve
the stationary problem in our proposed asymptotic regimes, and we show that the
identified solution is a stable fixed point of the corresponding evolutionary dynamics.
In Section 3.4 we construct the class of time-dependent solutions that stay in a neigh-
bourhood of the identified stationary solution. In the terminology of mathematical
economics, this stationary solution represents a turnpike (see, e.g., Kolokoltsov and
Yang [2012], Zaslavski [2006]) for the class of time-dependent solutions.
3.2 Formal Model
Let H = {1, · · · , |H| = n} be a finite set characterizing the hierarchical partition of
small players inside the environment, say their position in the bureaucratic staircase of
an organization. Alternatively, it may describe the extend of individuals’ infection to
a bio-weapon. Moreover, let B = {1, · · · , |B| = m} be a finite set characterizing the
behavioural or strategic partition of agents, say the level of compliance with official
regulations, or the degree of protection for PCs/citizens against cyber-criminals/bio-
terrorists. Then, the states of an agent are given by ordered pairs of the form (h, b),
with h ∈ H, b ∈ B, the finite state space being S = H ×B.
Remark 2. In some cases it is reasonable to include an additional zero state, some
kind of a rank-less sink, where no choice of B is available, say a corrupted civil
servant suspended from duty without the potential to be bribed, an infected individual
put in quarantine, and so forth. Thus, the state space can be either S = H ×B as
initially defined above, or S˜ = H ×B ∪ {0} = S ∪ {0} as alternatively implied with
this comment. We shall stick here to the first instance.
We distinguish the following three structures. Firstly, the decision structure
(B,ED, λ), that is a non-oriented graph with the set of vertices B and the set of
edges ED, where an edge e joins the vertices i and j when an agent is able to switch
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between states (h, i) and (h, j). Every such transition in B requires certain random
λ-exponential time. For simplicity, a single parameter λ is chosen for all possible
transitions. As mentioned, we shall mostly look at the asymptotic regime with
λ→∞. We take the agents to be homogeneous and indistinguishable, in the sense
that their strategies and payoffs depend only on their states, and not on any other
individual characteristics. Hence, a decision of an agent in a state (h, b) at any time
is given by the decision matrix u = (uhb→hb˜), expressing his intention to switch from
b to b˜, for all b˜ ∈ B such that b˜ 6= b. IWe consider agents without mixed strategies,
that is, for any state (h, b) the decision vector (uhb→hb˜) is either identically zero,
when the agent does not wish to change strategy, or there exists one strategy b1 6= b
such that uhb→hb1 = 1, and all the other coordinates of (uhb→hb˜) being zero, when
the agent wishes to change from strategy b to b1.
Secondly, the pressure structure (H,EP , qjb→ib), that is an oriented graph,
where an edge e joins the vertices j and i whenever a major player has the power (or
the authority) to upgrade or downgrade the small players from the hierarchy level
j to i. In this case, coefficients qjb→ib represent the rates of such transitions in H,
that is, every such transition requires certain qjb→ib-exponential waiting time. In
general, these rates may depend on some control of the principal (one can think of
some parameter describing the principal’s efforts or interference, for example his/her
budget). We shall not exploit this version here.
Finally, we consider the evolution structure that characterizes the change
in the distribution of states due to the agents’ pairwise interaction (e.g. through
exchange of opinions, fight with competitors, effect of established social norms, and
so forth). This can be described by the set of rates qss1→s2 , by which an agent in state
s can stimulate the transition of another agent from state s1 to state s2. For instance,
an honest agent (or even a corrupted one) may help the principal to discover, and
therefore punish, the illegal behaviour of a corrupted agent. Note that transitions due
to binary interaction can be naturally separated into transitions in B and transitions
in H, yielding respectively the behavioural and the hierarchical evolution structures.
Remark 3. The scaling 1/N for the rates of binary interactions is the standard
procedure of making the strength of N2 (total number of pairs) binary transitions
comparable to the strength of N unilateral transitions.
Here we shall ignore the behavioural element of the evolution structure. That
is, we shall assume that transition rates qss1→s2/N may not vanish only for two states
s1, s2 that differ strictly in their h-component. Moreover, since we shall work in
the asymptotic regime of small binary interactions, it would be helpful to introduce
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directly a small parameter δint discounting the power of these interactions. Then,
we shall denote thereafter the corresponding transition rates by δint · qsh1b→h2b/N .
Remark 4. The evolutionary transitions in B represent an alternative to the individ-
ual transitions described by the decision structure (B,ED, λ), and can be considered
negligible in the limit λ → ∞ that we shall look at here. Taking into account a
behavioural evolution structure is more appropriate in the absence of a decision
structure, which was the case developed in Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev [2015].
To introduce a more detailed description of our game-theoretic framework,
note that the states of the corresponding N players game are the N -tuples of the
form, {(h1, b1), . . . , (hN , bN )}, where each pair (hi, bi) describes each of the N players
position on the hierarchy and the behaviour axis respectively. Assuming that each
player adopts a decision matrix u, then the system evolves according to the continuous
time Markov chain introduced above, with the corresponding transitions rates as
were specified. If we further specify the rewards for staying in each state per unit of
time, the transition fees/costs for transiting from one state to another, as well as the
terminal payoffs corresponding to each state for some finite terminal time, then we
shall be working in the setting of a stochastic dynamic game of N players.
As usual in a MFG approach, we are interested in estimating the approximate
symmetric Nash equilibria. Assuming indistinguishable agents, the system’s state
space can be reduced to the set Znm+ of vectors n = (nij), i ∈ H, j ∈ B, where nij
denotes the number of agents in state (i, j), and N =
∑
ij nij denotes the (constant)
total number of agents. Therefore, the initially introduced Markov chain reduces to
the Markov chain on Znm+ , described by the time-dependent generator:
LtNF (n) =
n∑
a
m∑
β
n∑
c
naβ · qaβ→cβ ·
(
F (ncβaβ)− F (n)
)
+
n∑
a
m∑
β
n∑
c
n∑
γ
m∑
k
naβ · δint · qγkaβ→cβ/N · nγk ·
(
F (ncβaβ)− F (n)
)
+
n∑
a
m∑
β
m∑
c
naβ · λ · uaβ→ac ·
(
F (nacaβ)− F (n)
)
,
(3.1)
where the unchanged values in the arguments of function F on the right-hand side
are omitted. Equivalently, in the normalized version the system’s state space can be
reduced to the subset of the probability simplex ΣNn×m ⊆ Rn×m, with vectors of the
form x = (xij) = n/N , i ∈ H, j ∈ B, where each coordinate will represent now the
occupation density (alternatively the occupation probability) of each state (i, j). For
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the Markov chain on ΣNn×m, generator (3.1) can be rewritten in the equivalent form:
LtNf(x) =
n∑
a
m∑
β
n∑
c
xaβ ·N · qaβ→cβ ·
(
f(x+ (ecβ − eaβ)/N)− f(x)
)
+
n∑
a,c,γ
m∑
β,k
xaβ ·N · δint · qγkaβ→cβ/N · xγk ·N ·
(
f(x+ (ecβ − eaβ)/N)− f(x)
)
+
n∑
a
m∑
β
m∑
c
xaβ ·N · λ · uaβ→ac ·
(
f(x+ (eac − eaβ)/N)− f(x)
)
,
(3.2)
where {eij} is the standard orthonormal basis in Rn×m. Assuming, additionally, that
f is a continuously differentiable function on ΣNn×m, and taking its Taylor expansion,
in the limit of infinitely many agents N →∞, (3.2) eventually converges to:
Ltf(x) =
n∑
a
m∑
β
n∑
c
xaβ · qaβ→cβ ·
( ∂f
∂xcβ
− ∂f
∂xaβ
)
+
n∑
a
m∑
β
n∑
c
n∑
γ
m∑
k
xaβ · δint · qγkaβ→cβ · xγk ·
( ∂f
∂xcβ
− ∂f
∂xaβ
)
+
n∑
a
m∑
β
m∑
c
xaβ · λ · uaβ→ac ·
( ∂f
∂xac
− ∂f
∂xaβ
)
,
(3.3)
or equivalently to the form:
Ltf(x) =
n∑
a6=c
m∑
β
n∑
c
(xaβ · qaβ→cβ − xcβ · qcβ→aβ) · ∂f
∂xcβ
+
n∑
a6=c
m∑
β
n∑
c
n∑
γ
m∑
s
(xaβ · δint · qγsaβ→cβ · xγs − xcβ · δint · qγscβ→aβ · xγs) ·
∂f
∂xcβ
+
m∑
β
n∑
c
m∑
s 6=β
(xcs · λ · ucs→cβ − xcβ · λ · ucβ→cs) · ∂f
∂xcβ
.
(3.4)
This is a first order partial differential operator, that generates a deterministic
Markov process, whose dynamics are governed by the characteristic equations of Lt:
x˙ij =
m∑
k 6=j
(xik · λ · uik→ij − xij · λ · uij→ik) +
n∑
a6=i
(xaj · qaj→ij − xij · qij→aj)
+
m∑
k
n∑
a6=i
n∑
γ
(xaj · δint · qγksj→ij · xγk − xij · δint · qγkij→aj · xγk).
(3.5)
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These calculations make the following result plausible:
Proposition 5. Given the Markovian interaction we introduced above consisting
of the decision, the pressure-resistance and the evolution structures, if the elements
of the matrix-valued function x = (xij) denote the occupation probabilities of states
(i, j), and (ui,k→j) is the decision matrix that may depend on time, then the evolution
of x is given by system (3.5).
Remark 5. For a rigorous explanation (not just the formal description we provide
here) of the Markov chain’s convergence to the deterministic process given by (3.5),
see, e.g., Kolokoltsov [2012].
The above general structure is rather complicated. To deal effectively with
this complexity, one can distinguish two natural simplifying frameworks: (i) the
set of edges is ordered and only the transitions between neighbours are allowed,
(ii) the corresponding graph is complete, so that all transitions are allowed and
have comparable rates. We shall choose the second alternative for B, and the first
alternative for H thinking of it as an hierarchy of agents. Moreover, we shall assume
that the binary interaction occurs only within a common level in H, ignoring the
binary interaction between the agents in different levels of the hierarchy structure.
Therefore, for the transition rates qij→i+1,j of the pressure structure increasing in
i ∈ H, we introduce the shorter notation q+ij , and for the transition rates qij→i−1,j
decreasing in i ∈ H, we introduce the notation q−ij . Accordingly, for the transition
rates δint · qikij→i+1,j of the hierarchical evolution structure increasing in i ∈ H, we
introduce the shorter notation δint · q+kij , and for the transition rates δint · qiki→i−1,j
decreasing in i ∈ H, we shall use the notation δint · q−kij .
•••••
•••••
•••••
•••••
•••••
usj→sl(λ)
q+kil
q−kil
q+ij
q−ij
H
s
i
j k l B
Figure 3.1: The simplified version of our network: only the transitions between
neighbours are allowed in H, all transitions are allowed in B, binary interaction
occurs only within a common level in H.
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Applying the above (geometric) simplifications, the kinetic equations (3.5)
reduce to the following system:
x˙ij = λ ·
∑
k 6=j
(uik→ijxik − uij→ikxij) + q−i+1,j · xi+1,j + q+i−1,j · xi−1,j − (q+ij + q−ij) · xij
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
(q+ki−1,j · xi−1,k · xi−1,j + q−ki+1,j · xi+1,k · xi+1,j − (q+kij + q−kij ) · xik · xij).
(3.6)
Note that (3.6) hold only for the internal states (i, j), i ∈ H, j ∈ B, such
that i 6= 1, |H|, while for the boundary states (i, j) the terms involving downgrading
to i− 1 and upgrading to i+ 1 respectively are omitted. In particular, we consider:
q+knj = q
−k
1j = 0 , q
+
nj = q
−
1j = 0. (3.7)
Additionally, to simplify further the final explicit calculations, for all i ∈ H,
j ∈ B, we shall consider the constraint:
q+ij = q
−
i+1,j , (3.8)
which can be interpreted as a detailed balance condition; it actually asserts that the
number of downgrades is compensated in average by the number of upgrades.
Remark 6. An alternative simple (and analogously manageable) model allows the
principal either to move an agent one-step upward in the hierarchy with rates q+ij
and q+kij respectively, or send an agent directly down to the lowest state with rates q
d
ij
and qdkij respectively. In this case the system describing the evolution of occupation
densities becomes, for i 6= 1:
x˙ij = λ ·
∑
k 6=j
(ui,k→j · xik − ui,j→k · xij) + q+i−1,j · xi−1,j − (q+ij + qdij) · xij
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
(q+ki−1,j · xi−1,k · xi−1,j − q+kij · xik · xij)− δint ·
∑
k∈B
qdkij · xik · xij ,
(3.9)
with an obvious modification for i = 1.
To identify the agents’ optimal decision vector, we need first to define certain
game characteristics such as the state rewards and the transition costs. In particular,
we assign the reward wij per unit of time to an agent for staying in state (i, j), the
fee/cost fBkj for an agent’s elective transition from state (h, k) to state (h, j) (which
we assume independent of h for brevity), and the fine/cost fHj for an agent’s enforced
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transition from state (j, b) to state (j − 1, b) (which we assume independent of b for
brevity). Let, additionally, gij = gij(t) be the payoff corresponding to state (i, j) in
the process starting at time t and terminating at time T . Then, for an infinitesimally
small time step τ , and assuming that g(t) is continuously differentiable in time, an
agent at state (i, j) decides his/her strategy targeting to optimize the expression:
gij(t) = max
u
{
τ · wij + τ ·
(
λ · uij→ik · (gik(t+ τ)− fBjk) + q+ij · gi+1,j(t+ τ)
+q−ij(gi−1,j(t+ τ)− fHi ) +
m∑
k
xikδint(q
+k
ij gi+1,j(t+ τ) + q
−k
ij (gi−1,j(t+ τ)− fHi ))
)
+
(
1− τ · (λ · uij→ik + q+ij + q−ij +
m∑
k
xik · δint · (q+kij + q−kij ))
) · gij(t+ τ)}.
(3.10)
Remark 7. Depending on the application we investigate in each instance, the agent’s
optimum is either to maximize his/her payoff (fitness), or to minimize his/her cost.
Here we stick to the first case, thinking of the agents as bribed bureaucrats or defending
civilians.
Taking the Taylor expansion specifically of the term gij(t+ τ), and omitting
terms of order O(τ2), the above optimization equation turns into the following form:
wij +
∂gij(t)
∂t
+ max
u
{λ · uij→ik · (gik(t+ τ)− fBjk − gij(t))}
+
m∑
k
xik · δint · (q+kij · (gi+1,j(t+ τ)− gij(t)) + q−kij · (gi−1,j(t+ τ)− fHi − gij(t)))
+q+ij · (gi+1,j(t+ τ)− gij(t)) + q−ij · (gi−1,j(t+ τ)− fHi − gij(t)) = 0.
(3.11)
In the limit of infinitesimally small time step τ → 0, (3.11) implies the evolu-
tionary Hamilton-Jacoby-Bellman (HJB) equation, satisfied by the agents’ individual
optimal payoffs gij . A rigorous derivation of the HJB equation can be found in every
standard textbook on dynamic programming and optimal control, see, e.g., Kamien
and Schwartz [1991]. For stochastic dynamic programming, see, e.g., Ross [2014].
The above yields the following result:
Proposition 6. Given the Markovian interaction we introduced above consisting
of the decision, the pressure-resistance and the evolution structure, if gij = gij(t)
denotes the payoff to an agent at state (ij) in the process starting at time t and
terminating at time T , and subject to a given evolution of the occupation density
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vector x given by (3.6), these individual optimal payoffs will satisfy the following
evolutionary HJB equation:
g˙ij + λ ·max
u
{uij→ik · (gik − gij − fBjk)}+ q+ij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q−ij · (gi−1,j − gij − fHi )
+δint · (
∑
k∈B
q+kij · xik · (gi+1,j − gij) +
∑
k∈B
q−kij · xik · (gi−1,j − gij − fHi )) + wij = 0.
(3.12)
As above, note that (3.12) hold only for the internal states (i, j), i ∈ H,
j ∈ B, such that i 6= 1, |H|, while for the boundary states (i, j) the terms involving
transitions to i− 1 or from i+ 1 respectively are omitted. Indicatively, for i = 1 it is:
g˙1j = w1j + λ ·max
u
{u1,j→k · (gik − g1j − fBjk)}+ q+1j · (g2,j − g1,j)
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
q+k1j · xik · (g2j − g1j).
(3.13)
We shall consider here the optimization problem of estimating the discounted
optimal payoff (alternatively one can look for the average payoff in a long time
horizon). Hence, assuming the discounting coefficient δdis for future payoffs, the
evolutionary HJB equation for the discounted optimal payoff e−δdis·t · gij(t) of an
agent occupying state (i, j), with any finite planning horizon T , can be written as:
g˙ij + λ ·max
u
{uij→ik · (gik − gij − fBjk)}+ q+ij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q−ij · (gi−1,j − gij − fHi )
+
∑
k∈B
δint · xik · (q+kij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q−kij · (gi−1,j − gij − fHi )) + wij = δdis · gij(t).
(3.14)
The basic mean-field game consistency problem states that, for some interval
[0, T ], every agent will benefit from applying the same common control, that is, from
adopting the same decision vector. In other words, the MFG consistency condition
states that one needs to consider the kinetic equations (3.6) (i.e. the forward system),
where the collective control is taken into account, and the evolutionary HJB equations
(3.14) (i.e. the backward system), where individual controls are taken into account,
as a coupled forward-backward system of equations on a given time horizon [0, T ],
complemented by some initial condition x0 for the occupation density vector x,
and some terminal condition gT for the optimal payoff g, such that x, g and the
common u solve the aforesaid system. Our aim here is first to identify the solution
of the stationary consistency problem, and then to investigate the general time-
dependent problem, extending (if possible) our findings for the stationary problem.
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As mentioned, we shall work in three asymptotic regimes; fast execution of the agents’
personal decisions, weak binary interactions, and small payoff discounting in time.
3.3 Stationary Problem
The stationary MFG consistency problem consists of the stationary HJB equation for
the discounted optimal payoff of an agent at state (i, j), with a finite time horizon:
wij + λ ·max
u
ui,j→k · (gik − gij − fBjk) + q+ij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q−ij · (gi−1,j − gij − fHi )
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
xik · (q+kij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q−kij · (gi−1,j − gij − fHi )) = δdis · gij ,
(3.15)
where the evolution given by (3.6) is replaced with the analogous fixed point condition:
λ ·
∑
k 6=j
(ui,k→j · xik − ui,j→k · xij) + q−i+1,j · xi+1,j + q+i−1,j · xi−1,j − (q+i,j + q−i,j) · xij
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
q+ki−1,j · xi−1,k · xi−1,j + q−ki+1,j · xi+1,k · xi+1,j − (q+kij + q−kij ) · xik · xij = 0.
(3.16)
By analogy with the time-dependent problem, for the stationary mean-field
game consistency problem one needs to consider equations (3.15), (3.16) as a coupled
stationary system. In the asymptotic limit of fast execution of individual decisions,
λ→∞, the terms in (3.15), (3.16) containing the transition rates λ should obviously
vanish (otherwise they would ‘explode’ to infinity). For a practical interpretation
of this observation, one can think that if the execution of personal decisions is
significantly fast, then in a stationary state no agent should be interested in switching
his/her strategy. In this case (3.15), (3.16) turn respectively into the following form:
wij + q
+
ij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q−ij · (gi−1,j − gij − fHi )
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
xik · (q+kij · (gi+1,j − gij) + q−kij · (gi−1,j − gij − fHi )) = δdis · gij , (3.17)
and,
q−i+1,j · xi+1,j + q+i−1,j · xi−1,j − (q+i,j + q−i,j) · xij
+δint ·
∑
k∈B
q+ki−1,j · xi−1,k · xi−1,j + q−ki+1,j · xi+1,k · xi+1,j − (q+kij + q−kij ) · xik · xij = 0,
(3.18)
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supplemented by the consistency condition:
gik − gij − fBjk ≤ 0, (3.19)
for all i ∈ H, j, k ∈ B, such that xij 6= 0. In fact, the consistency condition (3.19)
ensures that all terms in (3.15) and (3.16) including elements of the decision matrix
indeed vanish in (3.17) and (3.18) for all the occupied states.
Introducing further the auxiliary notation w˜ij = wij − q−ij · fHi , (3.17) and
(3.18) are written respectively in the form:
(−ATj + δdis − δint · ETj (x)) · gij = w˜ij − δint · fHi ·
∑
k∈B
q−kij · xik, (3.20)
and,
(Aj + δint · Ej(x)) · xij = 0, (3.21)
where the matrices Aj , with the transpose matrix A
T
j , and Ej(x), with the transpose
matrix ETj (x), are given respectively by:
Aj =

−q+1j q−2j 0 . . .
q+1j −q+2j − q−2j q−3j . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . q+n−2,j −q+n−1,j − q−n−1,j q−nj
. . . 0 q+n−1,j −q−nj

, (3.22)
and,
Ej =

−∑
k
q+k1j x1k
∑
k
q−k2j x2k 0 . . .∑
k
q+k1j x1k −
∑
k
(q+k2j + q
−k
2j )x2k
∑
k
q−k3j x3k . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
∑
k
q+kn−2,jxn−2,k −
∑
k
(q+kn−1,j + q
−k
n−1,j)xn−1,k
∑
k
q−knj xnk
. . . 0
∑
k
q+kn−1,jxn−1,k −
∑
k
q−knj xnk

.
(3.23)
We shall look further for the asymptotic regime with small binary interaction
transition rates δint ·q±kij . Therefore, starting with (3.21) we are looking for stationary
solutions of the form:
xij = x
0
ij + δint · x1ij +O(δ2int). (3.24)
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Substituting (3.24) into (3.21), and equating terms of the same order in δ0int,
δ1int, we obtain respectively the equations:
O(δ0int) : Aj · x0ij = 0, (3.25)
O(δ1int) : Aj · x1ij + E0j · x0ij = 0. (3.26)
where the notation E0j corresponds to the matrix Ej containing only elements of
order O(δ0int) (we use respectively the notation E
0T
j for the transpose matrix).
Assumption 2. Let the detailed balance condition (3.8) hold with all transition
rates q+ij (or all q
−
ij respectively) being strictly positive. We shall use then the shorter
notation, for i ∈ H : i 6= n, j ∈ B:
qij = q
+
ij = q
−
i+1,j . (3.27)
In the linear approximation of vanishing δint, we end up with an uncoupled
system. Since different elements of B are also uncoupled, then, equations (3.25) and
(3.26) can be solved separately for any j ∈ B. Looking at the zero order of small
evolution transition rates, by (3.25), we have the following result:
Proposition 7. Let Assumption 2 hold. Then, the rank of Aj is exactly n− 1, while
the kernel of Aj is generated by the following vector:
x02j =
q+1j
q−2j
· x01j , x03j =
q+2j
q−3j
· q
+
1j
q−2j
· x01j , . . . , x0nj =
n−1∏
l=1
q+lj
q−l+1,j
· x01j
x01j =
1 + q+1j
q−2j
+
q+2j
q−3j
· q
+
1j
q−2j
+ · · ·+
n−1∏
l=1
q+lj
q−l+1,j
−1 x0j .
(3.28)
where we have introduced the auxiliary notation x0j =
∑
i x
0
ij. Specifically, under
the detailed balance condition Aj is symmetric, and its kernel generated by (3.28) is
proportional to the uniform distribution, x0ij = x
0
j/n for all i ∈ H, j ∈ B, that is,
Ker(Aj) is generated by (1, · · · , 1).
Proof. Notice that system (3.25) is degenerate, as expected, since we are looking
for non-negative solutions satisfying
∑
j x
0
1j + · · · + x0nj = 1. Thus, one of the n
equations of (3.25) can be discarded, say for example the last one. Rewriting the
system of the remaining (n − 1) equations by using the first equation, and then
adding sequentially to each of the next (n − 2) equations their previous one, one
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eventually obtains the following system:
q+1j · x01j − q−2j · x02j = 0
q+2j · x02j − q−3j · x03j = 0
...
q+n−1,j · x0n−1,j − q−nj · x0nj = 0.
(3.29)
This has an obvious solution, that is unique up to a multiplier, and is given
by (3.28). Alternatively, starting the exclusion from the last equation of (3.29), the
solution to (3.25) is given then by:
x0n−1,j =
q−nj
q+n−1,j
· x0nj , x0n−2,j =
q−n−1,j
q+n−2,j
· q
−
nj
q+n−1,j
· x0nj , . . . , x01j =
n−1∏
l=1
q−l+1,j
q+l,j
· x0nj
x0nj =
1 + q−nj
q+n−1,j
+
q−n−1,j
q+n−2,j
· q
−
nj
q+n−1,j
+ · · ·+
n−1∏
l=1
q−l+1,j
q+l,j
−1 · x0j .
(3.30)
Given now the detailed balance condition (3.8), and the non-degeneracy
established by Assumption 2, one observes from (3.28), or (3.30), that for every
strategy j ∈ B we have:
x01j = x
0
2j = · · · = x0nj = x0j/n.
We have shown that in the main order of small evolution rates δint · q±κij ,
x0∗ij = x
0∗
j /n is a fixed point of the evolution (3.6), along with the common control
ucom = (uij→iκ = 0), ∀i ∈ H, ∀j, κ ∈ B, that is consistent with condition (3.19), and
expresses the instantaneous execution of the agents’ personal decisions. Moreover,
this will be a stable solution of the stationary system, if x0∗ij = x
0∗
j /n is a stable fixed
point of (3.6), for ucom = (uij→iκ = 0), ∀i ∈ H, ∀j, κ ∈ B.
Assumption 3. For technical (computational) purposes only, let the hierarchy and
the strategy set be of the same size, i.e. |H| = |B| ⇒ n = m.
To conduct a stability analysis, in the asymptotic regimes of large λ and
small δint, let us introduce the auxiliary variables:
yκ = x
0
ij − x0∗ij , (3.31)
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where κ = i+ (j − 1) · n, such that κ ∈ K = {1, . . . , n2 − 1}.
Using the above variables, we transform system (3.6) into the non-degenerate
linear homogeneous system:
y˙ = Λ · y, (3.32)
where Λ is the block matrix:
Λ =

A1 0 . . . . . . . . .
0 A2 0 . . . . . .
. . . 0 Aj 0 . . .
. . . . . . 0 An−1 0
∆ . . . . . . ∆ D

. (3.33)
Each matrix ∆ has the same non zero entries −q−nn on its bottom row, while
the rest of its elements are equal to zero. Note, as well, that the Aj matrices are of
dimension n× n, and each zero matrix to the right of an Aj matrix is of dimension
n× n · (n− j)− 1. The (n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix D is given by:
D =

−q+1n q−2n 0 . . .
q+1n −q+2n − q−2n q−3n . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . q+n−3,n −q+n−2,n − q−n−2,n q−n−1,n
. . . 0 q+n−2,n − q−nn −q+n−1,n − q−n−1,n − q−nn

. (3.34)
Applying sequentially (starting with C1 ≡ A1, setting in the next step C1 ≡ A2
etc.) the following block matrix formula:
det
 C1 0
C2 C3
 = detC1 · detC3,
where C1, C2, and C3 are n × n, m × n, and m × m matrices respectively, the
determinant of Λ is given by:
det Λ = det(A1) · det(A2) · · · det(An−1) · detD. (3.35)
We further apply sequentially n− 1 times the elementary row operation of
row addition on every n× n matrix Aj , starting with row n and adding in each step
row i to row i− 1. Eventually, we transform Aj into a lower triangular matrix of the
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form: 
0 0 0 . . .
q+1j −q−2j 0 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . q+n−2,j −q−n−1,j 0
. . . 0 q+n−1,j −q−nj

, (3.36)
with a single zero eigenvalue, and n− 1 negative eigenvalues −q−ij , for i = 2, . . . , n.
Note that since Aj are symmetric matrices (due to the detailed balance condition),
the algebraic multiplicity of each of their eigenvalues is equal to the geometric
multiplicity.
Regarding the (n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix D, and bearing in mind the detailed
balance condition, we apply once the elementary row operation of adding row n− 1
to row n− 2, and then, we apply sequentially n− 2 times the elementary column
operation of adding column i to column i+ 1, starting with column 1, to eventually
transform D into the following lower triangular form:
−q+1n 0 0 . . .
q+1n −q+2n 0 . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . q+n−3,n −q−n,n 0
. . . 0 (q+n−2,n − q−n,n) −q−n−1,n

, (3.37)
with n − 1 negative eigenvalues −q+in, for i = 1, . . . , n − 1. In total, we find that
matrix Λ has one zero eigenvalue of algebraic multiplicity n − 1, and n · (n − 1)
negative eigenvalues. Now it is trivial to transform Λ into a block diagonal matrix,
subtracting sequentially from each column i, ∀i = {1, . . . , n · n− n}, each column j,
∀j = {n · n− n+ 2, . . . , n · n− 1}. For a block diagonal matrix, both the algebraic
and the geometric multiplicity of an eigenvalue is given by adding the multiplicities
from each block. Then, for the block matrix Λ the algebraic multiplicity of the zero
eigenvalue is equal to its geometric multiplicity.
We, thus, have the following result:
Lemma 3. Let the Assumptions 2, 3 hold. Consider the linear system y˙ = Λ · y as
defined above. The solution to this system, that is the vector x0∗ij = x
0∗
j /n given by
Proposition 7, is stable (but not asymptotically stable) since Λ has n · (n− 1) negative
eigenvalues, and a single zero eigenvalue whose algebraic multiplicity equals to its
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geometric multiplicity.
The third asymptotic regime we shall look at is that of small discounting δdis.
Obviously, no payoff discounting terms appear in the stationary kinetic equations
(3.18). Moving to the stationary HJB equation (3.17), or (3.20), initially we are
looking for solutions of the form:
gij = g
0
ij + δdis · g1ij . (3.38)
Substituting (3.38) into (3.20), and equating terms of zero order in δint and
δdis, we get the equation:
−ATj · g0ij = w˜ij , (3.39)
In general, equation (3.39) has no (non-degenerate) solution, since (by Propo-
sition 7) the kernel of the symmetric matrix ATj = Aj is one dimensional, implying
that the image of the transpose matrix ATj is (n−1) dimensional (by the rank-nullity
theorem). More precisely, equation (3.39) has in general no solution if:
(w˜ij , x
0
ij) =
x0j
n
·
∑
i
w˜ij 6= 0. (3.40)
Thus, to remain in the non-degenerate regime, we need to introduce addition-
ally the following assumption;
Assumption 4. For every strategy j ∈ B the following is true; ∑
i
w˜ij 6= 0.
As a result, we are looking next for solutions of (3.20) in the form of the
expansion:
gij = g
0
ij/δdis + g
1
ij + g
2
ij · δdis. (3.41)
Recall that we are looking at the asymptotic regime with small δint (weak
binary interaction), and small δdis (small payoff discounting). One needs to distinguish
clear assumptions on the relationship between the small parameters δint and δdis, for
a full perturbation analysis. In principle, the following three basic regimes can be
naturally identified:
ID1: Interaction is relatively very small, i.e. δdis = δ and δint = δ
2.
ID2: Interaction and Discounting are small effects of comparable order,
i.e. δdis = δint = δ.
ID3: Discounting is relatively very small, i.e. δint = δ and δdis = δ
2.
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We initially concentrate on the ID1 regime. Substituting (3.41) into (3.20),
and equating terms of order δ−1, δ0, δ1, we find respectively the following equations:
ATj · g0ij = 0
−ATj · g1ij + g0ij = w˜ij
−ATj · g2ij + g1ij − E0Tj · g0ij = 0.
(3.42)
The first equation in (3.42) tells us that g0ij belongs to the kernel of Aj (since
Aj = A
T
j ), that is, for arbitrary constants aj ∈ R, we get:
g0ij = aj · x0ij . (3.43)
The second equation in (3.42) tells us that w˜ij − g0ij belongs to the image of
Aj , which coincides with the orthogonal compliment to Ker(Aj), given the identity:
Im(Aj) = Ker
⊥(ATj ).
Besides, from Proposition 7 we find that the orthogonal compliment to Ker(Aj) is:
Ker⊥(Aj) = {x :
∑
i
xij = 0}. (3.44)
In this case, the fact that w˜ij − g0ij ∈ Im(Aj) further implies that:∑
i
w˜ij =
∑
i
g0ij ⇒ · · · ⇒ g0ij =
∑
i
w˜ij/n. (3.45)
Looking at the third equation in (3.42), and noting that E0Tj g
0
ij = 0 for a
uniform g0·j , we conclude that g
1
ij ∈ Im(Aj) as well, that is, g1ij ∈ Ker⊥(Aj). Thus,
to identify g1ij we need to invert Aj on the reduced (n− 1) dimension of Ker⊥(Aj).
Lemma 4. Let Assumption 2 hold, and let y ∈ Ker⊥(Aj). Then all solutions z to
the matrix equation Aj · z = y are given by the formula:
zij = z1j −
i−1∑
a=1
( a∑
β=1
yβj
qaj
)
, (3.46)
∀i 6= 1, with arbitrary z1j. There exists a unique solution z·j ∈ Ker⊥(Aj) specified
by:
z1j =
n−1∑
a=1
(n− a
n
·
a∑
β=1
yβj
qaj
)
. (3.47)
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Notice that formulae (3.46) and (3.47) yield zij = g
1
ij when yij = g
0
ij − w˜ij .
In particular, for g1ij we find the explicit expression:
g1ij =
n−1∑
a=1
((
1(i > a)·n− a− 1
n
+1(i ≤ a)·n− a
n
)·( a
qaj
·
∑
κ∈H
w˜κj
n
−
a∑
β=1
w˜βj
qaj
))
. (3.48)
where 1(·) is the indicator function.
Regarding the consistency condition (3.19), in the main order in small δ it
can be written in the equivalent form:∑
i
w˜ik <
∑
i
w˜ij , (3.49)
for all i ∈ H, k, j ∈ B. Given that w˜·,· does not depend on δ, this leads to the
interesting result that in the equilibrium of the asymptotic regime of small δ, only
those strategic levels j ∈ B are occupied (that is, x0j 6= 0), where the sum
∑
i w˜ij
obtains its maximum. For simplicity, let us further consider the following assumption;
Assumption 5. There exists a unique behavioural level b ∈ B, such that:∑
i
w˜ib >
∑
i
w˜ij . (3.50)
Note that Assumption 5 implies that in any equilibrium x∗, with δ sufficiently
small, all terms with j 6= b become irrelevant for the analysis.
We, thus, have the following result:
Proposition 8. Let Assumptions 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold. Consider the ID1 regime.
Then, the solution to the stationary problem described by (3.17), (3.18) and (3.19),
in the main order in small δ, is given by:
x∗ib = x
0∗
ib = 1/n, x
0∗
iκ = 0 ∀κ 6= b ∈ B, i ∈ H, gib = δ−1 · g0ib = δ−1 ·
∑
i
w˜ib/n,
(3.51)
where x0∗ij is a stable fixed point of (3.6).
Remark 8. If we continue in the next order of our perturbation analysis (subsequently
in the second next order, and so forth) we can obtain explicit approximate solutions
with arbitrary precision.
Next we consider the ID2 regime. In this case, we look at the solutions to
(3.18) in the next order with respect to small δ. In view of (3.51), we write (3.26) in
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the form:
Ab · x1ib + (q+bi−1,b − q+bib + q−bi+1,b − q−bib )/n2 = 0, (3.52)
where
∑
i x
1
ib = 0, and the usual convention for the boundary terms, i = 1, n, apply.
Note that the right-hand side of equation (3.52) belongs to Ker⊥(Aj), imply-
ing that: ∑
i
−(q+bi−1,b − q+bib + q−bi+1,b − q−bib )/n2 = 0, (3.53)
Moreover, given that x1ib ∈ Ker⊥(Aj), we can identify x1ib applying Lemma 4.
Formulae (3.46), (3.47) yield zib = x
1
ib when yib = −(q+bi−1,b − q+bib + q−bi+1,b − q−bib )/n2.
Regarding the solution to (3.20) in ID2, substituting (3.41) into (3.20), and
equating terms of order δ−1, δ0, δ1, we get respectively the following equations:
ATj · g0ij = 0
−ATj · g1ij + g0ij − E0Tj · g0ij = w˜ij
−ATj · g2ij + g1ij − E0Tj · g1ij − E1Tj · g0ij = −fHi ·
∑
k
q−kij · x0ik,
(3.54)
where the notation E1j corresponds to the matrix Ej containing only elements of
order O(δint) (we use respectively the notation E
1T
j for the transpose matrix).
The first two equations in (3.54) are identical with the corresponding equations
in (3.42) (recall that E0Tj g
0
ij = 0 for a uniform g
0
ij), and provide the same results
expressed through (3.43), (3.45). Looking at the third equation in (3.54), and noting
that E1Tj g
0
ij = 0, we observe that (g
1
ij − E0Tj g1ij + fHi ·
∑
k q
−k
ij · x0ik) ∈ Ker⊥(Aj),
implying that g1ij can be uniquely identified through formula (3.46) of Lemma 4,
with zij = g
1
ij and yij = g
0
ij − w˜ij , under the condition:∑
i
(g1ij − E0Tj · g1ij + fHi
∑
k
q−kij · x0ik) = 0. (3.55)
Last we consider the ID3 regime. Substituting (3.41) into (3.20), but equating
now terms of order δ−2, δ−1, δ0, we get the equations (in analogy to (3.42), (3.54)):
ATj · g0ij = 0
E0Tj · g0ij = 0
−ATj · g1ij + g0ij − E1Tj · g0ij = w˜ij .
(3.56)
Again, the first and the third equations in (3.56) lead to the same results with
the first and the second equations in (3.42), namely to (3.43) and (3.45) respectively,
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while the second equation in (3.56) always holds for a uniform g0ij .
We, thus, have the following result:
Proposition 9. The solution to the stationary consistency problem in the main
order in small δ in ID2 and ID3, is the same with the one identified in Proposition 8
for ID1.
3.4 Time-dependent Problem
In principle, the solution to a non-linear Markov game of mean-field type like the
one we consider here (on a finite time horizon), defines an -Nash equilibrium of the
corresponding game with a finite number of players, see, e.g., Basna, Hilbert and
Kolokoltsov [2014]. Having identified the solution to the stationary MFG consistency
problem, we need next to look at the time-dependent consistency problem in order
to validate our results for initial/terminal conditions other than those given by the
solution of the stationary problem. We further need to investigate the stability of
the fixed point x0∗ij (see Lemma 3) without assuming that from the very beginning
all players apply the same stationary control ucom = (uij→iκ = 0).
For the full time-dependent problem, the HJB equation for the discounted
optimal payoff e−δdis·t ·gij(t) of an individual at state (i, j) with any planning horizon
T is given by (3.14), where now the occupation density vector x = (xij) is also time
varying. For definiteness, we shall focus on the ID1 regime (the same method applies
for ID2, ID3 regimes). Our aim is to show that by fixing the control uiα→iβ = 0 in
(3.14), ∀i ∈ H,α, β ∈ B, the solution to the occurring system:
g˙iα + wiα + q
+
iα · (gi+1,α − giα) + q−iα · (gi−1,α − giα − fHi )
+
∑
k∈B
δint · xik · (q+kiα · (gi+1,α − giα) + q−kiα · (gi−1,α − giα − fHi )) = δdis · giα(t),
(3.57)
will be consistent, that is, the control uiα→iβ = 0 will indeed give a maximum in
(3.14) in all times.
Fixing the control uiα→iβ = 0, ∀i ∈ H,α, β ∈ B, is actually equivalent to
assuming that:
giβ(T )− fBαβ ≤ giα(T ). (3.58)
Our aim here is to show that starting with a terminal condition belonging to
the cone defined by (3.58), we shall stay inside the cone for all t ≤ T . Therefore, it
is sufficient to show that on the boundary of this cone the inverted tangent vector of
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(3.57) is never directed outside the cone. The necessary condition that needs to be
satisfied for this to be true for any boundary point gjβ − fBαβ = gjα is the following:
g˙jα − g˙jβ ≤ 0, (3.59)
where,
g˙jα − g˙jβ = δdis · (gjα − gjβ) + (wjβ − wjα) + q+jβ · (gj+1,β − gjβ)
−q+jα · (gj+1,α − gjα) + q−jβ · (gj−1,β − gjβ − fHj )− q−jα · (gj−1,α − gjα − fHj )
+
∑
k∈B
δint · xjk ·
(
q+kjβ · (gj+1,β − gjβ) + q−kjβ · (gj−1,β − gjβ − fHj )
−q+kjα · (gj+1,α − gjα)− q−kjα · (gj−1,α − gjα − fHj )
)
.
(3.60)
Substituting gij from (3.41), and xij from (3.24) into (3.60) (assuming that
fHj is independent of δ), and equating terms of similar order, then, in the main order
o(δ−1) in small δ, condition (3.59) will be equivalent to (recall that we are in the
ID1 regime):
q+jβ ·(g0j+1,β−g0jβ)+q−jβ ·(g0j−1,β−g0jβ) ≤ q+jα ·(g0j+1,α−g0jα)+q−jα ·(g0j−1,α−g0jα). (3.61)
Note that in the main order o(δ−1) in small δ (assuming that fBαβ is indepen-
dent of δ) for the specified boundary point of the cone we get:
g0jβ = g
0
jα, (3.62)
while for all the other i ∈ H, such that i 6= j, will be:
g0iβ ≤ g0iα. (3.63)
Combining (3.62) and (3.63) we obviously get:
g0jα − g0iα ≤ g0jβ − g0iβ, (3.64)
and rewriting (3.61) in the equivalent form:
q+jα ·(g0jα−g0j+1,α)+q−jα ·(g0jα−g0j−1,α) ≤ q+jβ ·(g0jβ−g0j+1,β)+q−jβ ·(g0jβ−g0j−1,β), (3.65)
we check that condition (3.65) is satisfied when qiα ≤ qiβ, ∀i ∈ H (the first term is
smaller or equal than the third term, the second term is smaller or equal than the
fourth term).
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But also for the case when qiβ < qiα, ∀i ∈ H, rewriting (3.64) in the equivalent
form:
g0iβ − g0jβ ≤ g0iα − g0jα, (3.66)
we check that (3.61) is satisfied (again the first term is smaller or equal than the
third term, the second term is smaller or equal than the fourth term).
We, thus, have the following result:
Proposition 10. Let Assumptions 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold. Assume additionally, ∀α, β ∈
B, that:
qiα ≤ qiβ or qiβ < qiα, ∀i ∈ H. (3.67)
Then, for sufficiently small discounting δdis = δ, and relatively smaller binary
interaction coefficient δint = δ
2, in the main order in small δ, for any T > t, and
for any initial occupation probability distribution x(t), and any terminal payoffs such
that:
giβ(T )− fBαβ ≤ giα(T ),
there exists a unique solution to the time-dependent discounted MFG consistency
problem such that the control u is stationary, and is given by uiα→iβ = 0, ∀i ∈ H,
∀α, β ∈ B, x(s) stays near the fixed point of Proposition 8 as s→ T , and gij(s) stays
near the stationary solution of Proposition 8 (almost for all time), for large T − t.
Chapter 4
The Uniformed Patroller
4.1 Introduction
When patrolling a given network against an attack, or infiltration, at an unknown
node, there are two plausible scenaria. Either (i) the Patroller may be essentially
invisible to the Attacker (e.g. a stealthy drone, a plain-clothes policeman, or a driver
of an unmarked car); or (ii) the Patroller may be immediately identifiable by the
Attacker (e.g. through his/her uniform - hence our title, or his/her driving a police
car). Thus far the literature on patrolling games has concentrated exclusively on
the first (invisible Patroller) scenario. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
attempt to model the consequences of the second scenario of a uniformed (noisy)
Patroller. Some consequences of this distinction are fairly obvious; for example, a
rational mugger will never initiate an attack in a subway car when a uniformed
policemen is present. Other consequences, to be explored here, are less obvious.
A game theoretic model of the Attacker-Patroller conflict on a network has
recently been the subject of several investigations. Among others, Alpern, Morton
and Papadaki [2011] modelled the problem as a zero-sum game between a Patroller
and an Attacker, where the Attacker can attack a chosen node in a chosen time
period and the Patroller hopes to intercept the attack in time, by following a chosen
walk on the network. Their common payoff is the probability that the attack is
intercepted. Formally, the Attacker chooses a node i to carry out an attack for a
time interval J (a finite sequence of m ≥ 2 consecutive periods of time); accordingly,
the attack is intercepted if the Patroller is at node i at some time period within the
interval J . Here, we keep these dynamics and payoff the same. However, to partially
simplify the problem we restrict the Patroller to Ergodic Markovian strategies, such
that every time the Patroller arrives at a node of the network he/she leaves it by the
64
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same distribution over its neighbours (and the node itself).
Note that in the original game-theoretic formulation presented above, the
Attacker’s strategy (i, J) cannot depend in any way on the Patroller’s locations at
any time prior to the interval J . However, in many real world situations of this
type, the Patroller is identifiable; he/she might be wearing a uniform, driving in a
marked car, or making a characteristic noise. Therefore, as we assume in our model
presented here, the Attacker can go to the node he/she wishes to attack, and wait
there prior to his/her attack. The Attacker can observe when the Patroller is present
at the chosen attack node, and when he/she is not. Once the Patroller leaves the
attack node, the Attacker only knows that the Patroller is not there; namely, he/she
cannot see the Patroller from a distance (vision is limited to the attack node). This
assumption defines a game U(Q,m), where Q is the network to be defended, and m
is the difficulty of the attack or infiltration as measured in terms of the time required.
The Attacker’s pure strategy can now be defined as an ordered pair (i, d), such
that he/she goes to node i and initiates his/her attack after the Patroller has been
there first and, subsequently, has been away for d consecutive periods (delay time).
However, since the Patroller is identifiable (e.g. wearing a uniform), his/her Ergodic
Markovian strategy can be assumed to be known to the Attacker; therefore, we adopt
a Stackelberg approach where the Patroller is the first to move. This is actually a
common assumption in patrolling problems. We solve this game for small values of
m and several families of networks: star networks, line networks, circle networks and
star-in-circle networks. In particular, both line and circle networks can be interpreted
as perimeters of regions to be defended against infiltration. As such, these are models
of border defence by uniformed patrollers, thus modifying the border patrol game
introduced by Papadaki et al. [2016].
The motivation for the Uniformed Patroller Problem originates in the 1970’s,
when a uniformed policeman was assigned to every subway train (consisting of ten
cars, thus being equivalent to the line network L10) in New York City. In the first
months at least, the policeman patrolled in a back and forth motion, from car 1 to
car 10 and backwards. This patrol was evidently quite foolish as, in our notation,
the attack strategy (1 , 1) (attacking an end car as soon as the Patroller has left it)
would guarantee a win even if the difficulty m of the attack (i.e. the attack duration)
was as large as 17. Finding optimal patrolling strategies in this context remains an
open issue until now, over thirty years later. Indicatively, note that if the Patroller
on this train is following a random walk and the time required for a mugging is for
example m = 2, it is not optimal to attack as soon as the Patroller leaves your end
car (d = 1), as he will catch you with probability 1/2. It is clearly better to wait for
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some larger number of periods d in which the Patroller is away.
Patrolling related problems have been studied for long, see, e.g., Morse and
Kimball [1951], but almost exclusively from the Patroller’s point of view. A game
theoretic approach, modelling an adversarial Attacker who wants to infiltrate or
attack a network at a node of his/her choice, has only recently been introduced by
Alpern, Morton and Papadaki [2011]. The techniques developed there were later
applied to the class of line networks by Papadaki et al. [2016], with the interpretation
of patrolling a border. Other research following a similar reasoning includes Lin et al.
[2013] for random attack times, Lin, Atkinson and Glazebrook [2014] for imperfect
detection, Hochbaum, Lyu and Ordez [2014] on security routing games, and Basilico,
De Nittis and Gatti [2015] for uncertain alarm signals. See also Baykal-Gu¨rsoy et al.
[2014] on infrastructure security games. Earlier work on patrolling a channel/border
with different paradigms, includes Washburn [1982, 2010], Szechtman et al. [2008],
Zoroa N, Ferna´ndez-Sa´ez and Zoroa P [2012], and Collins et al. [2013]. The related
problem of ambush is studied by Baston and Kikuta [2004, 2009], while an artificial
intelligence approach to patrolling is given by Basilico, Gatti and Amigoni [2012].
Applications to airport security and counter terrorism, are given respectively by Pita
et al. [2008], and Fokkink and Lindelauf [2013]. The problem introduced here, of
patrolling a network where the Attacker can identify the Patroller only when he/she
is in close proximity (e.g. when both being at the same node), appears to be new.
We organize Chapter 4 as follows. In Section 4.2 we explain our model giving
a specification of the uniformed Patroller problem on an arbitrary finite network. In
Section 4.3 we solve the game for the star network Sn with a central node connected
to n ends. It turns out that the Attacker must attack at an end after delaying for
d = 2 periods; accordingly, the Patroller must decide with what probability to stay at
the center when being there. In Section 4.4 we solve the game for the line graph Ln
with n nodes, for n = 4, 5. Here an attack should be executed at an end node. The
optimal delay and the (Ergodic) Markovian patrol depend on the attack difficulty m
and the number of nodes. In Section 4.5 we analyse the game on the circle network
Cn with n nodes. A point of interest here is that the Patroller can intercept an
attack either returning from the direction that he/she left the attack node, or from
the opposite direction around the circle. In Section 4.6 we consider a hybrid network
consisting of a circle network with a center that is connected to all nodes of the circle.
Finally, in Section 4.7 we allow non-Markovian patrols, and identify links between
our game and the so-called ‘spy games’, where both players can see each other, or
surveillance problems, where an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) must travel across a
network being away from each node for no longer than a specified time.
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4.2 Formal Model
An attack strategy is a pair (i, d), where i is a node of a given finite network Q, and
d is the number of consecutive time periods that the Patroller (e.g. the subway train
policeman) must be away from node i for the Attacker to initiate his/her attack.
To illustrate the waiting parameter d (we use for this alternately the terms waiting
time and delay), suppose that the presence (at the Attacker’s chosen node i) of
the Patroller is indicated by a 1, respectively his/her absence is indicated by a 0.
Suppose further that the Attacker waits until the Patroller arrives at the attack
node, and after that his/her presence-absence sequence is say 11010110 . . . . If the
Attacker’s waiting time is for example d = 2, then his/her decision as to whether or
not to attack in each subsequent period is illustrated below:
1 11 110 1101 11010 110101 1101010 11010100
wait wait wait wait wait wait wait attack!
Table 4.1: The Attacker attacks after d = 2 periods of the Patroller’s absence
If for example the attack difficulty is m = 3, then the attack will be successful
only if the Patroller’s sequence continues with two more 0’s, that is, 1101010000 . . .
Note that the attack can begin in the same period that the Patroller’s absence has
been observed. Thus, we take m > 1 as otherwise the Attacker could win simply
by attacking as soon as the Patroller is not present at his/her node. The above
discussion explains the critical parameter d from the Attacker’s point of view, who
simply observes the alternation of Patroller’s presence or absence at his/her chosen
node. To illustrate the attack mechanism in the context of both players, take the
network Q as the line graph L4 with four nodes, and consider the dynamics presented
in Figure 4.1, where the time axis is drawn horizontally and the line graph is drawn
vertically (the nodes are labelled 1 to 4 from top to bottom).
Suppose that the Attacker chooses to attack node 2 , of difficulty m = 2, with
delay d = 2, and say the Patroller is at this node at time t = 0. Hence, the Attacker
will remain at node 2 indicated by the horizontal red line in Figure 4.1. We consider
two potential patrols adopted by the Patroller on the line network L4; the walk
w1 = (2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, . . . ) drawn in green on top, and the walk w2 = (2, 3, 4, 3, 2, 3, . . . )
drawn in blue on the bottom. Take first the Attacker’s response to w1. At time t = 2
the Attacker resets his/her waiting clock to zero, but at time t = 4 since the Patroller
is still away after d = 2 periods, he/she initiates the attack that lasts for the time
interval {4, 5} indicated by a thick green horizontal line. However, since the Patroller
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is back at node 2 at time t = 5, the attack is intercepted (the green patrol intersects
the thick green horizontal attack). Next, consider the Attacker’s response to w2.
At time t = 2 he/she begins the attack that lasts for the time interval {2, 3} indicated
by a thick blue horizontal line. Since the Patroller is not back at node 2 after m = 2
periods, the attack is not intercepted (the blue patrol is disjoint from the thick blue
horizontal attack). Thus, against the attack strategy (node 2 , d = 2), the patrol w1
wins for the Patroller, while the patrol w2 loses.
11111
22222
33333
44444
1
2
3
4
0t = 1 2 3 4 5
Figure 4.1: Example of Attacker-Patroller dynamics for the line graph L4.
The reader might as well think that the Attacker has additional strategies
which are not specified by our restriction simply to pairs (i, d). For example he/she
could initiate the attack after say three consecutive 0’s when he/she initially arrives
at node i, without necessarily first waiting for the Patroller to visit node i and then
counting three consecutive 0’s. However, we show that the Attacker can always gain
at least as good an outcome using a strategy of the type (i, d). In particular, since we
assume that the Patroller has been patrolling for an arbitrarily long time before the
period when the Attacker arrives at node i, then we could tell the Attacker, for free,
the total number of 0’s at node i since the last 1 (including the three 0’s the Attacker
has witnessed). Say for example this total is 7. If the Attacker chooses to ignore this
new information, and attack as planned, his/her expected payoff is the same as that
of the strategy (i, 7). On the other hand, if the Attacker changes his/her strategy
and decides not to attack, then he/she is consistent with some strategy (i, d).
4.3 The Star Network
The network Sn is the star with a single center connected to n end nodes. We restrict
the Patroller to Markovian strategies that reflect from the ends with probability s,
from the center c go to each end with equal probability p, and remain at the center
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with probability r = 1 − n · p. This setting simplifies the game by introducing a
single parameter family of patrolling strategies. We begin by assuming that the
attack takes place at an end node, which we denote by e, and then we show that the
Patroller should reflect from the ends (s = 1). Note that since we have taken m ≥ 2,
reflecting from the ends will further imply that the Attacker should never attack at
the center c because in that case the Patroller will never be away from it for two
consecutive periods (i.e. will always intercept such an attack).
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Figure 4.2: The star network Sn with a central node connected to n ends.
4.3.1 Attack duration m = 2
Initially we assume that an attack takes m = 2 periods. In this case, an attack at
node e cannot be intercepted if it starts when the Patroller is at another end node
e
′ 6= e, but only if the Patroller is at the center. Therefore, an attack at node e will
be intercepted with probability q ·p, where q is the probability that the Patroller is at
the center c at the beginning of the attack, which in turn implies that the Attacker
should choose the waiting time d so as to minimize q.
We wish to calculate how the probability q that the Patroller is at c changes
over time, as the Patroller continues to be away from the Attacker’s chosen node e.
Thus, suppose that at some period t the Patroller is not at e, but he/she is either at
c with probability q, or at one of the end nodes other than e with probability 1− q.
Then, in the following period t+ 1 the Patroller will be either at c with probability
q · r + (1− q) · s, or he/she will be at node e with probability q · p+ (1− q) · 0.
Hence, conditional on the Patroller not being at node e, the probability that
he/she is at the center c is given by:
f(q, s) =
q · r + (1− q) · s
1− p · q . (4.1)
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Fraction (4.1) is increasing in s, and since it is s ≤ 1, then we have that
f(q, s) is maximized for s = 1 at:
f(q) = f(q, 1) =
q · r + (1− q)
1− p · q =
1− n · p · q
1− p · q . (4.2)
Additionally, since from equation (4.2) we find that:
f
′
(q) = − p · (n− 1)
(1− p · q)2 < 0,
then f(q) is decreasing and therefore minimized for q = 1, with f(1) = qˆ, where it is:
qˆ =
(1− n · p)
(1− p) . (4.3)
The Attacker can obtain this minimum probability qˆ of the Patroller being
at the central node c at the beginning of the attack, by initiating the attack on the
second period that the Patroller is away from his/her chosen node e, that is, by
adopting the waiting time d = 2. Notice that the optimal Attacker’s strategy (e, 2)
does not depend on p, namely the initial assumption that the Attacker knows p is
not necessary in this case. The attack (e, 2) will be intercepted if the Patroller is at c
in its first period and he/she goes to e in its second period, that is, with probability:
a2(n, p) = qˆ · p = b(p) = (1− n · p) · p
1− p . (4.4)
For a given star network Sn, the Patroller will choose the value of p in order
to maximize the interception probability (4.4). Figure 4.3 shows the variation of the
interception probability a2(n, p) with p, respectively for n = 2, . . . , 8 arcs in the star
network. Recall that p ∈ [0, 1/n] is the probability with which the Patroller moves
to an end node when he/she is at the center c.
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Figure 4.3: The interception probability a2(n, p), for n = 2(blue), . . . , 8(yellow).
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Indicatively, for the n = 2 arcs star (which is equivalent to a line network with
three nodes), the Patroller’s optimal walk is to move from the center towards each
end with probability about 0.3, and remain at the center with probability about 0.4.
For the n = 3 arcs star, the Patroller’s optimal walk is to move towards each of the
three end nodes with probability about 0.2, and remain at the center with probability
about 0.4, etc.. We can be more precise about these Patroller’s optimal strategies.
In particular, the optimal value pˆ = pˆ(n) for p depends on n and can be found
by solving the first order equation:
a
′
2(p) =
(n · p2 − 2 · n · p+ 1)
(1− p)2 . (4.5)
This can be simply written in the following form:
n · p2 − 2 · n · p+ 1 = 0, (4.6)
giving the optimal values:
pˆ = 1−
√
n · (n− 1)
n
, (4.7)
and
rˆ =
√
n · (n− 1)− (n− 1). (4.8)
Equations (4.7), (4.8) show respectively that the optimal probability pˆ is
asymptotic to 1/(2 · n), while the optimal probability rˆ goes asymptotically to 1/2.
The value V of the game is given by
V = a(n, pˆ) = (2 · n− 1)− 2 ·
√
n · (n− 1). (4.9)
In Figure 4.4 we plot the optimal patrol in terms of the probability of remaining
at the center, and the corresponding value of the game, for increasing number of nodes.
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Figure 4.4: Optimal values for m = 2.
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We can pull together the above results into the following proposition;
Proposition 11. Consider the Uniformed Patroller Problem on the star network Sn
consisting of n arcs, and an attack difficulty of m = 2. The optimal Patroller’s strategy
is to reflect off the end nodes and to remain at the central node with probability:
rˆ(n) =
√
n · (n− 1)− (n− 1). (4.10)
Accordingly, the optimal Attacker’s strategy is to locate at a random end node and
initiate the attack in the second period that the Patroller is away (i.e. d = 2).
The interception probability under these strategies, namely the value of the game, is:
V (n) = (2 · n− 1)− 2 ·
√
n · (n− 1). (4.11)
Remark 9. We observe that Proposition 11 suggests an attack strategy which does
not require any prior knowledge of the Patroller’s Ergodic Markovian strategy. That is,
the pair of strategies we mention there determines a Nash equilibrium of the uniformed
Patroller game. This is indeed a significantly stronger result compared to what we
were seeking for when initially considered a Stackelberg approach. Note that this
Nash property holds in our later results as well, though we make no claim here for
the general existence of a Nash equilibrium in our game for all networks.
4.3.2 Attack duration m = 3
Here we investigate the case when the attack takesm = 3 periods. Again, suppose that
the attack takes place at the end node e, and at a time period when the conditional
probability that the Patroller is at the center provided that he/she is not at node e
is given by q. Then, the attack will be intercepted in three different instances
corresponding to the Patroller’s location at the three periods of the ongoing attack;
ce , cce , e
′
ce
(where e
′ 6= e is any other end node),
The cumulative probability of these three distinct events, namely the inter-
ception probability of the attack, is given by:
q · p+ q · r · p+ (1− q) · s · p = p · ((1 + r − s) · q + s), (4.12)
which is increasing in q, since p < 1/n. Therefore, as for the case when m = 2,
the Attacker should begin the attack when the conditional probability q that the
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Patroller is at the center given that he/she is not at the attack end node is minimized.
We have seen from the same analysis for m = 2 in Section 4.3.1 that this
occurs when d = 2, where the minimized q = qˆ is given by (4.3). Then, substituting
equation (4.3) into (4.12) we get:
p ·
(
(1 + r − s) · r
1− p + s
)
=
(
1− 1− np
1− p
)
· s− r
p− 1 · (r + 1). (4.13)
Since the coefficient of s on the right hand of (4.13) is evidently positive,
it follows that the Patroller maximizes the interception probability (4.13) by taking
s = 1 (i.e. reflection), so that the interception probability (4.12) simply becomes:
q · p+ q · r · p+ (1− q) · p. (4.14)
Conclusively, substituting the optimal values q = qˆ and s = 1, the interception
probability (4.12) becomes:
a3(n, p) = p ·
(
1 +
(1− n · p)2
1− p
)
. (4.15)
Lemma 5. For n > 1, the interception probabilities a3(n, p) = gn(p) are increasing
for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1n .
Proof. We have from (4.15) that:
g
′
n(p) =
hn(p)
(1− p)2 , (4.16)
where hn(p) is the polynomial:
hn(p) = −2 · n2 · p3 + 3 · n2 · p2 + 2 · n · p2 − 4 · n · p+ p2 − 2 · p+ 2. (4.17)
To prove our claim we must show that hn(p) are positive on [0,
1
n ]. The poly-
nomials hn(p) are convex on [0,
1
n ], since:
h
′′
n(p) = 6 · n2 + 4 · n− 12 · n2 · p+ 2 ≥ 6 · n2 + 4 · n− 12 · n+ 2, (4.18)
where p · n ≤ 1. Then, we have for n ≥ 1 that:
h
′′
n(p) ≥ 6 · n2 − 8 · n+ 2 ≥ 0. (4.19)
Moreover, the polynomials hn(p) have a unique minimum on [0,
1
n ] when their
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first derivative satisfies:
h
′
n(p) = −6 · n2 · p2 + 6 · n2 · p+ 4 · n · p− 4 · n+ 2 · p− 2 = 0, (4.20)
or equivalently, when probability p is equal to:
p¯ =
2 · n+ 1
3 · n2 , (4.21)
which is evidently less than 1n , since for n ≥ 1 it is:
1
n
− 2 · n+ 1
3 · n2 =
n− 1
3 · n2 . (4.22)
Conclusively, we find for n ≥ 1 that:
hn(p¯) =
(n− 1)2 · (18 · n2 + 8 · n+ 1)
27 · n4 ≥ 0. (4.23)
which proves our claim.
According to Lemma (5), the interception probability (4.15) is maximized for
p ∈ [0, 1n ] at pˆ = 1n with a maximum value of a3(n, 1n) = 1n . This corresponds to a
random walk with probability rˆ = 0 of remaining at the center. In particular, if the
attack is initiated after any even number of periods with the Patroller being away
from the attack node e, that is, with an even delay d, then the Patroller visits a
single random end node in the three period attack interval, which means that he/she
visits the attack node e with probability 1n , as seen by an alternative calculation
above. We can summarize our findings into the following proposition;
Proposition 12. The solution to the Uniformed Patroller Problem on the star
network Sn with m = 3 is for the Patroller to follow a random walk with reflection
at the ends (i.e. r = 0, s = 1), and for the Attacker to initiate her attack at an end
node after d = 2 consecutive periods of the Patroller being away. Then, the value
of the game (i.e. the probability that the optimal attack is intercepted) is given by
V = 1/n.
4.3.3 Attack duration m = 4
We finally consider the case where the attack lasts for four periods. Here, if the
Attacker initiates her attack with the Patroller being at the center, then he gets two
chances to intercept it, namely to find the correct end. However, if the attack starts
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with the Patroller being at an end node, then he gets only one chance. In the first
case, the Patroller can intercept the attack with any of the following sequences:
ce , cce , ccce , ce
′
ce,
where e
′
is any end node other than the attack end node e, while in the second case
the Patroller can intercept the attack with either of the following two sequences:
e
′
ce , e
′
cce , e
′
e
′
ce.
It follows that the attack will be intercepted with overall probability:
a4(n, p, s, q) = q ·
(
1 + r + r2 + (1− p− r) · s) · p
+(1− q) · (s+ s · r + (1− s) · s) · p
= q · p · (1 + r + r2 + (1− p− r) · s− s− s · r − (1− s) · s)
+p · (2 · s+ r · s− s2),
(4.24)
where, like before, q is the conditional probability that the Patroller is at the center
at the beginning of the attack given that he/she is not at the attack node e. Note
that the coefficient of q in (4.24) is given by the product of p with the expression
1 + r · (1− s) + r2 + (1− p− r) · s− s · (2− s)
≥ 1 + r · (1− s) + r2 + (1− p− r) · s− 1
= r · (1− s) + r2 + (1− p− r) · s
≥ 0,
(4.25)
since r+p ≤ r+n ·p = 1, and s ≤ 1. It follows that for fixed n and p, the interception
probability (4.24) is increasing in q. Thus, by the same reasoning that we have used
for m = 2 and m = 3, it further follows that the Attacker should choose to wait for
d = 2 periods to attain q = qˆ, and the minimum interception probability of
a4 =
p
1− p
(
(p+ r − 1) · s2 + 2 · (1− p− r · p− r2) · s+ r · (1 + r + r2)). (4.26)
To check that (4.26) is increasing in s, notice that the derivative with respect
to s in the bracketed quadratic above is given by
2 · (p+ r − 1) · s+ 2 · (1− p− r · p− r2)
≥ 2 · (p+ r − 1) · 1 + 2 · (1− p− r · p− r2),
(4.27)
Draft of 9:20 pm, Sunday, March 25, 2018 76
since r + p < 1, which is equivalent to:
2 · r · (1− p− r) ≥ 0, (4.28)
since both factors are non-negative.
Consequently, it turns out that the Patroller maximizes the interception
probability for fixed p by choosing s = 1 (i.e. reflecting at the ends). Taking s = 1
in (4.26), gives:
a4(n, p) =
p
1− p ·
(
2 · r − p− 2 · p · r − r2 + r3 + 1)
=
−n3 · p4 + 2 · n2 · p3 + 2 · n · p3 − 3 · n · p2 − 3 · p2 + 3 · p
1− p .
(4.29)
In Figure 4.5 we plot the variation of the interception probability a4(n, p)
with p, for different number of nodes, while in Table 4.2 we give the maxima of
a4(n, pˆ) for the optimal pˆ given by (4.7).
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Figure 4.5: The interception probability
a4(n, p), for n = 2 (blue), . . . , 8 (grey).
n pˆ a4(n, pˆ)
2 0.4111 0.5391
3 0.2705 0.3618
4 0.2019 0.2720
5 0.1611 0.2179
6 0.1340 0.1817
7 0.1147 0.1559
8 0.1003 0.1364
Table 4.2: The interception probability
a4(n, pˆ), for n = 2, . . . , 8.
4.4 The Line Network
The line network Ln consists of n nodes i ∈ K, and n− 1 edges. The two end nodes
1 and n are connected respectively to the penultimate nodes 2 and n − 1 , while the
n− 2 internal nodes j 6= 1 ,n, are connected respectively to nodes j − 1 to the left,
and j + 1 to the right. We restrict the Patroller to Ergodic Markovian strategies,
introducing the following setting. At the ends he/she reflects with probability κ,
while he/she stays put with probability ` = 1 − κ. From any other internal node
j 6= 1 ,n, he/she moves towards the closest and the furthest end with probability pj
and qj respectively, while he/she remains at the node with probability rj = 1−pj−qj .
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To be consistent with this notation, we set p0 = pn = 0, q0 = qn = κ, and r0 = rn = `.
In the special case when Ln consists of an odd number of nodes, the Patroller shifts
from the center towards the two end nodes with equal probability c, staying around
with probability s = 1− 2 · c.
We further assume that the Patroller is symmetric in his/her random pa-
trolling, namely that:
pj = pn+1−j and qj = qn+1−j ,
which ensures that the transition matrix An characterizing the Patroller’s walk
consists of n− 1 parameters.
This last assumption establishes a symmetry regarding the Attacker’s strategy
as well. That is, provided that the Patroller ‘announces’ an Ergodic Markovian
patrol (pi, qi, c, κ)i∈K , the Attacker anticipates equivalent interception probabilities
(i.e. payoff) for her attack adopting either of the strategies (i, d) and (n+ 1− i, d),
where i, n+1−i are symmetric, with respect to the center, nodes, and d is the number
of periods the Attacker waits after the Patroller leaves her node before attacking.
We focus our attention on the analysis of an attack planned to take place at
an end node, in particular at node 1 . The Patroller’s initial position distribution
in this case is x(0) = (1, 0, . . . , 0). His/Her future position distribution conditional
to him/her not having returned to the attack node 1 for t consecutive periods is
denoted by x(t) = (x
(t)
1 , . . . , x
(t)
n ), where x
(t)
1 = 0 for t > 0. Notice that whenever
the Patroller returns to the attack node, t is reset to zero and his/her position
distribution becomes again x(0). For that, we refer to x(t) as the Patroller’s away
distribution at t > 0. For example, the first two periods that the Patroller is away
from node 1 , his/her away distribution is:
x(1) = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), x(2) = (0,
r2
1− p2 ,
q2
1− p2 , 0, . . . , 0), etc.
More generally, if we define the row vector y(t), for t ≥ 0, by the product:
y(t) = x(t) ×An, (4.30)
then the Patroller’s away distribution at t ≥ 1 is given by the following iteration
formula:
x(t) =
x(t−1) ×An − (y(t−1)1 , 0, 0, 0)
1− y(t−1)1
. (4.31)
Recall that we adopt a Stackelberg approach where the Patroller moves first,
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hence we set the Patroller to ‘announce’ first his/her strategy. Of course, in practice
we interpret this as the Attacker observing the Patroller’s motion on the network
prior to deciding her strategy. The objective for the Patroller is to ‘announce’ the
optimum strategy (pˆi, qˆi, κˆ, cˆ) that maximizes the interception probability of an attack
of known difficulty m for what is rationally the Attacker’s optimum waiting time
tˆ. Contrarily, the objective for the Attacker is to decide how many periods to wait
in the absence of the Patroller from his/her chosen node before starting the attack.
Namely, the Attacker aims to decide the optimum waiting time tˆ that minimizes
the interception probability of his/her attack for what is the announced-observed
Markovian patrol. Hence, the interception probability of an attack under the two
players’ optimal strategies, that is the value V of the game, is given by:
V = max
An
min
t
pim(pi, qi, κ, c, t) = pim(pˆi, qˆi, κˆ, cˆ, tˆ), (4.32)
where pim(pi, qi, κ, c, t) is the interception probability of an attack at node 1 of
duration m, under the patrol An and with attack delay d = t.
We solve this game numerically for the line networks L4 and L5, for given
values of the attack duration m. The line network L3 has been examined as a
sub-case of the star network, since it is equivalent to S2.
4.4.1 The Network L4
First we analyse the uniformed patrolling game on the line network L4 drawn below.
1 2 3 4
κ
` `
q2p2 p2q2 κ
r2 r2
Figure 4.6: The line network L4
To avoid unnecessary subscripts we introduce the following notation; p2 = p,
q2 = q, r2 = r. The general formula for recursively calculating the Patroller’s away
distribution, given by the vector equation (4.31), reduces to the following system:
(1− p · x(t−1)2 ) · x(t)2 = (1− p− q) · x(t−1)2 + q · x(t−1)3 ,
(1− p · x(t−1)2 ) · x(t)3 = (q − κ) · x(t−1)2 + (1− p− q − κ) · x(t−1)3 + κ.
(4.33)
For fixed p, q and κ, system (4.33) defines a continuously differentiable
mapping T2 : ∆
2 → ∆2. Any vector of the form (0, x2, x3, x4), such that x2, x3, x4 ∈
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(0, 1) and x2 + x3 + x4 = 1, will be a fixed point of T2, if it also satisfies the system:
(p+ q − p · x2) · x2 = q · x3,
(κ+ p+ q − p · x2) · x3 = κ+ (q − κ) · x2.
(4.34)
For the optimal patrolling strategies we estimate below, these equations have
a unique solution which gives the limiting Patroller’s away distribution under these
optimal patrols. We aim to calculate the interception probability pim of an attack at
node 1 , considering five cases regarding its duration m = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
• For m = 2, if the Attacker initiates the attack when the Patroller is anywhere
else but node 2 , he/she executes it without interception with probability 1. If
however the Patroller is at node 2 when the attack starts, then it is intercepted
with probability p. The interception probability is given by:
pi2(p, q, κ, t) = p · x(t)2 .
• For m = 3, if the Attacker initiates the attack when the Patroller is at the
opposite end node, he/she executes it without interception with probability 1.
If however the Patroller is at nodes 2 or 3 when the attack starts, then it
is intercepted with non-zero probability. The overall interception probability is
given by:
pi3(p, q, κ, t) = p ·
(
1 + (1− p− q)) · x(t)2 + p · q · x(t)3 .
• For m = 4, 5, 6 respectively, the Patroller intercepts an attack at node 1 with
non-zero probability regardless of the node he/she is at when the Attacker
initiates it. Indicatively, the overall interception probability for the attack
duration m = 4 is given by:
pi4(p, q, κ, t) = p ·
(
1 + (1− p− q) + (1− p− q)2 + q2) · x(t)2
+p · q · (1 + 2 · (1− p− q)) · x(t)3 + p · q · κ · x(t)4 ,
whereas we omit the lengthy explicit formulas for pi5(p, q, κ, t) and pi6(p, q, κ, t).
We have estimated numerically, for d = t ≤ 15, the critical game values for
the above five cases, and we present our findings in Table 4.3 rounded to four decimal
places. Note that we include an additional column with the interception probabilities
under the Patoller’s optimal walk (pˆ, qˆ, κˆ) for each case, but for the Attacker’s waiting
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time d = t 15. One can think of pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ,∞) as the interception probability the
Attacker can expect if he/she waits a long time before starting his/her attack.
for d = t ≤ 15 (pˆ, qˆ, κˆ) tˆ pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ, tˆ) pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ,∞)
m = 2 (0.3935, 0.3309, 1) 4 0.1032 0.1067
m = 3 (0.5, 0.5, 1) 2 0.25 0.25
m = 4 (0.4317, 0.4076, 1) 4 0.2960 0.3158
m = 5 (0.5, 0.5, 1) 2 0.4375 0.4375
m = 6 (0.4974, 0.4267, 1) 4 0.4551 0.4766
Table 4.3: Critical Game Values for L4 (Attack node 1 )
Remark 10. We find that the Patroller should always reflect at the ends (κˆ = 1).
Additionally, for an odd attack duration (m = 3, 5) the optimal patrol is a random
walk (pˆ = qˆ = 0.5) that reflects at the boundaries, that is, the Patroller should never
remain at the same node for two consecutive periods; respectively, the Attacker’s best
strategy is (1 , 2). For an even attack duration (m = 2, 4, 6) the Patroller optimally
remains at an internal node with non-zero probability, which, however, decreases as
we increase m (rm=2 > rm=4 > rm=6). We further observe that pˆ > qˆ for an even m.
Indicatively, when m = 4 the optimal values of p and q are respectively 0.4317
and 0.4076. The optimal Attacker’s response to this Markovian patrol is to initiate
his/her attack (at node 1 ) in the fourth period (d = 4) that the Patroller is away
from the attack node. Under these optimal strategies the attack is intercepted with
probability 0.2960. In the alternative case when the Attacker chooses to wait for a
long time at the absence of the Patroller before attacking (d = t 1), his/her attack
will be more likely to be intercepted (with probability 0.3158).
However, there are two questions that naturally arise regarding our analysis,
and need further investigation. To treat both of them we adopt a qualitative approach.
(i) How confident we can be that for a waiting time d = t > 15 the Attacker cannot
achieve a lower interception probability?
A method to investigate this first issue is to generate the interception
probabilities pim(p, q, κ, t) for increasing values of t (and for the optimum
probabilities pˆ, qˆ, κˆ given in Table 4.3), and check whether we reach the limiting
interception probabilities pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ,∞) without crossing below the optimum
interception probabilities pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ, tˆ) that we have estimated for d = t ≤ 15.
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As we see in Figure 4.7, this appears to be the case for m = 2 (4.7a), m = 4
(4.7b), and m = 6 (4.7c), while for m = 3 and m = 5 we already reach the
Patroller’s stationary away distribution from the second period.
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(c) m = 6
Figure 4.7: Interception probability for an attack at node 1 of L4, under the
optimal patrol, for increasing delay.
(ii) Can the Attacker do any better by attacking a penultimate node (2 or 3 ) instead
of attacking an end node?
Regarding the second issue, we work as follows. For every attack duration
m, we consider the optimum patrol (pˆ, qˆ, κˆ) that we have estimated for an
attack at the end node 1 , say for example the patrol (0.4947, 0.4267, 1) for
m = 6, and we generate the corresponding interception probability for an
attack at node 2 for various waiting times d = t. Indicatively, for m = 6 we get
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Figure 4.8: Interception probability for an attack at node 2 of L4, under the
optimal patrol estimated for an attack at node 1 , for increasing delay, for m = 6.
As we see in Figure 4.8, the minimum interception probability (0.7207)
that we find for the attack strategy (2 , 1) is greater than the corresponding
interception probability (0.4551) that we have found for the attack strategy
(1 , 4), both estimated under the optimal patrol (0.4974, 0.4267, 1), see Table 4.3.
Hence, attacking at an end node, under the strategy (1 , 4), is the Attacker’s
optimal choice. Similar results we obtain for the rest of the cases, as we present
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in the following table.
for (pˆ, qˆ, κˆ) pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ, tˆ)/Node 1 pim(pˆ, qˆ, κˆ, tˆ)/Node 2
m = 2 (1 , 4)− 0.1032 (2 , 2)− 0.1363
m = 3 (1 , 2)− 0.2500 (2 , 1)− 0.5000
m = 4 (1 , 4)− 0.2960 (2 , 2)− 0.5237
m = 5 (1 , 2)− 0.4375 (2 , 1)− 0.7500
m = 6 (1 , 4)− 0.4551 (2 , 2)− 0.7207
Table 4.4: Compare attacks at nodes 1 and 2 under the optimal patrol for node 1
4.4.2 The Network L5
Next we consider the line network L5 which differs from L4 in having a central node.
` `r s r
1 2 3 4 5
κ qp cc q p κ
Figure 4.9: The line network L5
Expanding the general recursive formula (4.31), we can rewrite the Patroller’s
away distribution for L5 into the following system of equations:
(1− p · x(t−1)2 ) · x(t)2 = (1− p− q) · x(t−1)2 + c · x(t−1)3 ,
(1− p · x(t−1)2 ) · x(t)3 = q · x(t−1)2 + (1− 2 · c) · x(t−1)3 + q · x(t−1)4 ,
(1− p · x(t−1)2 ) · x(t)4 = κ− κ · x(t−1)2 + (c− κ) · x(t−1)3
+(1− p− q − κ) · x(t−1)4 .
(4.35)
For fixed p, q, c and κ, system (4.35) defines a continuously differentiable
mapping T3 : ∆
3 → ∆3. Again, to be able to determine the limiting behavior of
the Patroller’s away distribution in L5 for any fixed p, q, c and κ, we note that any
stochastic vector (0, x2, x3, x4, x5) is a fixed point of T3, if it satisfies the system:
(p+ q − p · x2) · x2 = c · x3,
(2 · c− p · x2) · x3 = q · (x2 + x4),
(p+ q + κ− p · x2) · x4 = κ− κ · x2 + (c− κ) · x3.
(4.36)
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For the optimal patrolling strategies we estimate below, these equations have
a unique solution, that is the Patroller’s away distribution the Attacker can expect
if he/she waits a long time at the Patroller’s absence before initiating the attack.
We can now determine the interception probability pim corresponding to the
Markovian parameters p, q, c and κ of the Patroller’s walk, and the Attacker’s delay
d = t. We consider the same five cases regarding the attack duration, m = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
• In the first case, where m = 2, the Patroller may intercept the attack only by
being at node 2 when it starts. Then, the interception probability is given by:
pi2(p, q, c, κ, t) = p · x(t)2 .
• In the second case, where m = 3, the Patroller intercepts the attack by being at
either of nodes 2 or 3 when it starts. The overall interception probability:
pi3(p, q, c, κ, t) = p ·
(
1 + (1− q − p)) · x(t)2 + p · c · x(t)3 .
• In the third case, where m = 4, the Patroller intercepts the attack by being at
nodes 2 , 3 , or 4 when it starts. The overall interception probability is given by:
pi4(p, q, c, κ, t) = p ·
(
1 + (1− p− q) + q · c+ (1− p− q)2) · x(t)2
+c · p · (1 + (1− p− q) + (1− 2 · c)) · x(t)3 + q · c · p · x(t)4 .
• In the last two cases, where m = 5, 6 respectively, the Patroller intercepts an
attack at node 1 with non-zero probability regardless of the node he/she is at
the beginning of the attack. We omit the explicit formulas for pi5 and pi6.
We have estimated numerically, for d = t ≤ 15, the critical game values for the above
five cases, and we present our findings in Table 4.5 rounded to four decimal places.
for d = t ≤ 15 (pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ) tˆ pim(pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ, tˆ) pim(pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ,∞)
m = 2 (0.4342, 0.4110, 0.4096, 1) 10 0.0646 0.0664
m = 3 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1) 12 0.1464 0.1464
m = 4 (0.4663, 0.4330, 0.4216, 1) 8 0.1890 0.1932
m = 5 (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1) 14 0.2714 0.2714
m = 6 (0.4821, 0.4598, 0.4332, 1) 8 0.3 0.3088
Table 4.5: Critical game values for L5 (Attack node 1 )
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Remark 11. As expected from the analysis for L4, the Patroller should reflect at the
ends in this case too. Similarly, we conclude that a random walk is the optimal patrol
when the duration of the attack is odd (i.e. for m = 3, 5). A third observation is
that for an even attack duration (i.e. for m = 2, 4, 6) the optimal pˆ is always greater
than the optimal qˆ, namely the optimal strategy for the Patroller is always to move
towards the closest end with higher probability than move towards the center. One
can conclude, as well, that increasing the attack duration for even values, the optimal
patrol converges to a random walk, since pˆ, qˆ and cˆ increase in even m. Note that
our findings are in principle identical with those obtained in Subsection 4.4.1 for the
network L4.
However, the same issues arise here regarding the validity of our findings for a
rather long delay d = t > 15, and the choice of the optimal attack node. To treat both
we work the same way like before. Firstly, we generate the values of pim(pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ, t),
m = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, for increasing values of t, and check whether we reach the limiting in-
terception probabilities without crossing below the optimal interception probabilities
that we have estimated for d = t ≤ 15. As we see in Figure 4.10, this appears to be
the case for every m, which validates our findings given in Table 4.5, for d = t > 15.
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(e) m = 5
Figure 4.10: Interception probabilities for an attack at node 1 of L5, under the
optimal patrol, for increasing delay.
Regarding the optimal attack node, assuming the optimal patrols we have esti-
mated for an attack at node 1 , first we generate the corresponding interception prob-
abilities for an attack at nodes 2 and 3 for increasing delays t, then we identify their
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minima occurring at a specific t value, and last we compare those minima with the
maxmin probabilities pim(pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ, tˆ) of Table 4.5. Indicatively, for m = 4 we obtain:
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(a) Attack Node 2
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(b) Attack Node 3
Figure 4.11: Interception probability for an attack at nodes 2 and 3 of L5, under
the optimal patrol estimated for an attack at node 1 , for increasing delay, for m = 4.
As we see in Figures 4.11(a) and 4.11(b), for m = 4, the minimum interception
probabilities 0.2886 and 0.5132, that we find respectively for the attack strategies
(2 , 4) and (3 , 2), are both greater than the minimum interception probability 0.1890
that we have found for the attack strategy (1 , 8) (all estimated for the optimal
patrol (0.4663, 0.4330, 0.4216, 1), see Table 4.5). Similar results, confirming that the
Attacker should comparatively attack at an end node (node 1 in this instance), we
obtain for the rest of the m values we have considered, as we present in Table 4.6.
for (pˆ, qˆ, cˆ, κˆ) pim/Node 1 pim/Node 2 pim/Node 3
m = 2 0.0646− (1 , 10) 0.0876− (2 , 4) 0.1080− (3 , 2)
m = 3 0.1464− (1 , 12) 0.25− (2 , 2) 0.5− (3 , 1)
m = 4 0.1890− (1 , 8) 0.2886− (2 , 4) 0.5132− (3 , 2)
m = 5 0.2714− (1 , 14) 0.4375− (2 , 2) 0.75− (3 , 1)
m = 6 0.3− (1 , 8) 0.4545− (2 , 4) 0.7473− (3 , 2)
Table 4.6: Compare attacks at nodes 1 and 2 , 3 under the optimal patrol for node 1
4.5 The Circle Network
The circle network Cn is a closed walk consisting of n nodes, and equal number of
edges. Like above, we restrict the Patroller to Ergodic Markovian strategies such
that the Patroller leaves every node with overall probability 2 · p, moving clockwise
and anticlockwise with the same probability p, while he/she remains at the same
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node with probability r = 1− 2 · p. Given this symmetric patrol, every strategy (i, d),
for a random node i and a given delay d, is equally advantageous for the Attacker.
According to our setting, the transition matrix Bn characterizing the Pa-
troller’s Ergodic Markovian walk on the circle network is parametrized by a single
parameter p. Without loss of generality, we take node 1 as the attack node.
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Figure 4.12: The circle network Cn
We denote the Patroller’s away distribution from node 1 , for t > 0, by
x(t) = (0, x
(t)
2 , . . . , x
(t)
n ), where x(0) = {1, 0, . . . , 0}. Equivalently to our approach in
Section 4.4, if we define the row vector y(t), for t ≥ 0, by:
y(t) = x(t) ×Bn, (4.37)
then the Patroller’s away distribution from node 1 , at t ≥ 1, is given by the iteration:
x(t) =
x(t−1) ×Bn − (y(t−1)1 0, 0, 0)
1− y(t−1)1
. (4.38)
We consider networks C4, C5, and we solve the game numerically for given values of m.
4.5.1 The Network C4
We start with the circle network with four nodes. Equivalently to (4.38), we can
rewrite the Patroller’s away distribution for C4 into the following system of equations:
(1− p+ p · x(t−1)3 ) · x(t)2 = (1− 2 · p) · x(t−1)2 + p · x(t−1)3 ,
(1− p+ p · x(t−1)3 ) · x(t)3 = p+ (1− 3 · p) · x(t−1)3 ,
(4.39)
which defines a continuously differentiable map T (x
(t)
2 , x
(t)
3 ) = (x
(t+1)
2 , x
(t+1)
3 ). There is
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a unique stationary solution of T of the form (0, x2, x3, x4), independent of p, given by:
(0, x2, x3, x4) = (0,
2−√2
2
,
√
2− 1, 2−
√
2
2
). (4.40)
We take four cases regarding the attack duration, m = 2, 3, 4, 5. Indicatively we have:
• In the first case, where m = 2, the interception probability is given by:
pi2(p, t) = p · (x(t)2 + x(t)4 ).
• In the second case, where m = 3, the interception probability is given by:
pi3(p, t) = 2 · p · (1− p) · (x(t)2 + x(t)4 ) + 2 · p2 · x(t)3 .
• In the third case, where m = 4, the interception probability is given by:
pi4(p, t) = p ·
(
2− 2 · p+ (1− 2 · p)2 + 2 · p2) · (x(t)2 + x(t)4 )
+2 · p2 · (3− 4 · p) · x(t)3 .
• In the fourth case, where m = 5, the interception probability is given by:
pi5(p, t) = p ·
(
2− 2 · p+ (1− 2 · p)2 + (1− 2 · p)3 + 2 · p2 · (4− 6 · p))
×(x(t)2 + x(t)4 ) + 2 · p2 ·
(
2 · p2 + 2 · (1− 2 · p)2 + 3− 4 · p) · x(t)3 .
We have estimated numerically, for d = t ≤ 15, the critical game values for the above
four cases, and we present our results in Table 4.7 rounded to four decimal places.
for d = t ≤ 15 pˆ tˆ pim(pˆ, tˆ) pim(pˆ,∞)
m = 2 0.2929 2 0.1716 0.1716
m = 3 0.5 1 0.5 0.5
m = 4 0.4515 2 0.5216 0.6021
m = 5 0.5 1 0.75 0.75
Table 4.7: Critical game values for C4
Like before, we aim to examine (qualitatively) whether our results are valid for
a relatively long delay d = t > 15. For m = 2, 3, 5, the optimal interception probabili-
ties coincide with the corresponding limiting interception probabilities (see Table 4.7).
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Accordingly, for m = 4, we reach the limiting interception probability without cross-
ing below the optimum interception probability that we have estimated for d = t ≤ 15
(see Figure 4.13). Thus, we claim our results are valid for infinitely large delay d = t.
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Figure 4.13: Interception probability for an attack at a random node of C4 under
the optimal patrol, for increasing delay, for m = 4.
4.5.2 The Network C5
Next we consider the circle network with five nodes. Equivalently to (4.38), we can
rewrite the Patroller’s away distribution from node 1 into the following system:
(1− p+ p · x(t−1)3 + p · x(t−1)4 ) · x(t)2 = (1− 2 · p) · x(t−1)2 + p · x(t−1)3 ,
(1− p+ p · x(t−1)3 + p · x(t−1)4 ) · x(t)4 = p+ (1− 3 · p) · x(t−1)4 − p · x(t−1)2 ,
(1− p+ p · x(t−1)3 + p · x(t−1)4 ) · x(t)3 = p · (x(t−1)2 + x(t−1)4 )
+(1− 2 · p) · x(t−1)3 ,
(4.41)
which defines a continuously differentiable mapping T3 : ∆
3 → ∆3. There is a unique
stationary solution of T3 of the form (0, x2, x3, x4, x5), that is also independent of p:
(0, x2, x3, x4, x5) = (0,
3−√5
4
,
√
5− 1
4
,
√
5− 1
4
,
3−√5
4
). (4.42)
We take here the same four cases as in Section 4.5.1 regarding the attack duration m.
• In the first case, where m = 2, the interception probability is given by:
pi2(p, t) = p · (x(t)2 + x(t)5 ),
• In the second case, where m = 3, the interception probability is given by:
pi3(p, t) = 2 · p · (1− p) · (x(t)2 + x(t)5 ) + p2 · (x(t)3 + x(t)4 ),
Draft of 9:20 pm, Sunday, March 25, 2018 89
• In the third case, where m = 4, the interception probability is given by:
pi4(p, t) = p ·
(
2− 2 · p+ (1− 2 · p)2 + p2) · (x(t)2 + x(t)5 )
+3 · p2 · (1− p) · (x(t)3 + x(t)4 ),
• In the last case, where m = 5, the interception probability is given by:
pi5(p, t) = p ·
(
2− 2 · p+ (1− 2 · p)2 + p2 + 2 · p2 · (1− 2 · p) + p3)
×(x(t)2 + x(t)5 ) + p2 ·
(
3− 4 · p2 + 3 · (1− 2 · p)2) · (x(t)3 + x(t)4 ).
We have estimated numerically, for d = t ≤ 15, the critical game values for the above
four cases, and we gather our results in Table 4.8 rounded to four decimal places.
for d = t ≤ 15 pˆ tˆ pim(pˆ, tˆ) pim(pˆ,∞)
m = 2 0.3820 2 0.1459 0.1459
m = 3 0.3820 2 0.2705 0.2705
m = 4 0.4450 2 0.3808 0.4282
m = 5 0.5 2 0.5 0.5716
Table 4.8: Optimal game values for C5
Like before, we want to examine whether increasing the attack duration
d = t ≥ 15 (for constant p = pˆ), we reach the limiting interception probability
without crossing below the optimum interception probability that we have estimated
for d = t ≤ 15. For m = 4, 5 this appears to be the case as we see in Figure 4.14,
while for m = 2, 3 the optimum interception probability coincides with the limiting
interception probability (see Table 4.8).
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Figure 4.14: Interception probability for an attack at a random node of C5 under
the optimal patrol, for increasing delay.
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4.6 The Star in the Circle Network
The star in the circle network En combines the star and the circle networks we have
considered above. It consists of n end nodes, one central node, and 2 · n edges. As
usual, we take a Markovian Patroller, leaving an end node towards an adjacent end
node with probability p, and towards the centre with probability q, moves from the
centre towards each of the end nodes with probability r, while remains at an end
node with probability a = 1−2 ·p− q, and at the centre with probability b = 1−n · r.
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Figure 4.15: The star in the circle network En
The transition matrix Γn describing the Patroller’s walk on the star in the
circle network is parametrized by three parameters, p, q, r. Regarding the Attacker,
he/she has two options. Either to attack, equally preferably, at one of the ends, or
to attack at the centre. To highlight the Attacker’s bounded rationality, here we
introduce an additional strategic element. We set the Attacker holding a counter of
limited storing capacity counting his/her delay. When the Patroller leaves the attack
node, the Attacker turns on the counter recording periods at the Patroller’s absence
up to a finite level D (max delay). If the Patroller has not returned after D periods,
the Attacker can no longer count his/her absence and adjust the attack, that is, the
Attacker can rationally initiate the attack after waiting at most for D periods. We
call such an Attacker a Finite Automata Agent, in alignment with Rubinstein [1986].
Without loss of generality, we take the end node 1 as the attack node. In accordance
with (4.31) and (4.44), the Patroller’s away distribution from node 1, for t ≥ 1, is:
x(t) =
x(t−1) × Γn − (z(t−1)1 , 0, 0, 0)
1− z(t−1)1
, (4.43)
where z(t) = x(t) × Γn is the row vector defined for t ≥ 0, and x(0) = (1, 0, . . . , 0).
The Patroller’s away distribution from the centre, for t ≥ 1, is defined by
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y(t) = (y
(t)
1 , . . . , y
(t)
n , 0). For an attack at the centre of duration m, the interception
probability is given by:
pic(q,m) = (m− 1) · q. (4.44)
Recall that we aim to find the optimal patrol (pˆ, qˆ, rˆ), and the optimal
delay tˆ. First though we need to examine which node the Attacker optimally attacks.
Obviously, if the Patroller announces qˆ such that pic(qˆ,m) < pim(p, qˆ, r, t) then the
Attacker should attack the centre. Therefore, here we deal with the following problem:
max
Γn
min
t
pim(p, q, r, t) = pim(pˆ, qˆ, rˆ, tˆ) : pim(pˆ, qˆ, rˆ, tˆ) ≤ pic(qˆ,m), (4.45)
the solution of which actually makes the Attacker indifferent of which node to attack.
4.6.1 The Network E3
First we consider the star in the circle network with three ends. The interception
probability of an attack at node 1 of duration m = 2, 3, 4, as a function of p, q, r, t, is:
• for m = 2,
pi2(p, q, r, t) = p · (x(t)2 + x(t)3 ) + r · x(t)c ,
• for m = 3,
pi3(p, q, r, t) = (p+ a · p+ p2 + q · r) · (x(t)2 + x(t)3 ) + (r + 2 · r · p+ b · r) · x(t)c ,
• for m = 4,
pi4(p, q, r, t) = r · (2 · p+ b+ 1 + b2 + 2 · q · r + p2 + 2 · b · p+ 2 · a · p) · x(t)c
+
(
p · (1 + a+ p+ a2 + 2 · a · p+ 3 · q · r + p2) + q · r · (1 + a+ b)) · (x(t)2 + x(t)3 ).
We solve the game numerically, for D = 15, and we gather our results in
Table 4.9, rounded to four decimal places.
for D = 15 (pˆ, qˆ, rˆ) d = tˆ pim(pˆ, qˆ, rˆ, tˆ)
m = 2 (0.3333, 0.3333, 0.3333) 1 0.3333
m = 3 (0.3560, 0.2881, 0.3333) 2 0.5761
m = 4 (0.3762, 0.2476, 0.3333) 2 0.7428
Table 4.9: Critical game values for E3
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4.6.2 The Network E4
Next we consider the star in the circle network with four end nodes. The interception
probability of an attack at node 1 of duration m = 2, 3, 4 as a function of p, q, r, t is:
• for m = 2,
pi2(p, q, r, t) = p · (x(t)2 + x(t)4 ) + r · x(t)c ,
• for m = 3,
pi3(p, q, r, t) = (p+ a · p+ q · r) · (x(t)2 + x(t)4 ) + (2 · p2 + q · r) · x(t)3
+r · (1 + 2 · p+ b) · x(t)c ,
• for m = 4,
pi4(p, q, r, t) = r · (1 + 2 · p+ b+ 2 · b · p+ 2 · a · p+ b2 + 3 · r · q + 2 · p2
) · x(t)c
+
(
2 · p2 + q · r + 4 · a · p2 + 4 · p · q · r + a · q · r + q · b · r) · x(t)3
+
(
2 · p3 + 3 · q · r · p+ p+ a · r + q · r + a2 · p+ a · q · r + q · b · r) · (x(t)2 + x(t)4 ).
We solve the game numerically, for D = 15, and we gather our results in
Table 4.10, rounded to four decimal places.
for D = 15 (pˆ, qˆ, rˆ) d = tˆ pˆim(pˆ, qˆ, rˆ, tˆ)
m = 2 (0.2835, 0.1695, 0.25) 2 0.1695
m = 3 (0.3993, 0.2013, 0.25) 2 0.4026
m = 4 (0.4147, 0.1706, 0.25) 2 0.5118
Table 4.10: Critical game values for E4
4.7 Variations with a Non-Markovian Patroller
In this last section, we drop the requirement that the Patroller adopts a Markovian
strategy, allowing him/her to adopt arbitrary walks on the patrolling network Q.
By extension, we relate variations of the Uniformed Patroller problem introduced
here, with two deterministic problems on networks considered extensively in the
computer science literature. We take the search-patrolling region Q to be a finite
network with integer edge lengths, that is, with integer travel times.
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4.7.1 The UAV-Pinwheel Problem
Suppose a reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) must return to locations
i at most every κi periods. Is this possible when the locations i are the nodes of
a given network Q, where d(i, j) is the given integer number of periods to travel
between nodes i and j? If not, how many UAV’s K are required to make this task
possible? This problem is called the cyclic routing UAV (CRUAV) problem, see, e.g.,
Ho and Ouaknine [2015]. For K = 1 it is related to a winning condition for the
Patroller in an extended patrolling game U∗ = U∗(Q,m1,m2, . . . ,mn), where mi is
the duration of an attack at node i of Q (in our original setting mi = m for every
node i). If there is a solution to the CRUAV problem with κi = mi − 1, then this
solution is a winning solution for the Patroller in the patrolling game U∗. Of course
such strategies are non-Markovian.
To illustrate this problem, consider the network drawn below as taken from
Ho and Ouaknine [2015]. This problem has a positive solution with K = 1, that
is, the periodic walk DCABACDACBA, which has period 11. The return times
to A are 2, 5, 5, 5 (≤ 5), to B are 7, 10 (≤ 10), to C are 5, 5, 6 (≤ 6), and to D
are 8, 9 (≤ 9). Note that no walk of period 4 (a minimum period walk visiting all
nodes) returns to node A (node with the minimum attack duration) in time 5, as
the required edges have at most two with length 1 and the rest with length 2, that
is, such a four period walk/patrol lasts at least for 1 + 1 + 2 + 2 = 6 periods. Hence,
the Uniformed Patroller problem on this network has value 1, that is, the Patroller
intercepts any attack of the given durations with probability 1.
C6
B10
A5
D9
2
1
2
12
2
Figure 4.16: Example of the cyclic routing UAV problem. Ho and Ouaknine [2015]
Apparently, the CRUAV problem is a variant of the so-called Pinwheel
Problem, see, e.g., Holte et al. [1989], and of the Patrolling Security Games, as those
have been discussed in Basilico, Gatti and Amigoni [2012], Basilico, De Nittis and
Gatti [2015]. In principle, the CRUAV problem has direct, important connections
with the general family of scheduling problems.
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4.7.2 Spy Games
Our model gives the Attacker additional information compared with the original
Patrolling Games, that is, he/she can see whether the Patroller is located at the
same location with him/her. Suppose that we let the Attacker can see the Patroller
wherever he/she is. We keep our original assumption that the attacks at any node
require the same number of periods m. In this case the Attacker may want to move,
for example in a direction away from the Patroller, before starting his/her attack.
We allow the two players to alternate in moving, with the Patroller constrained to
moving only to an adjacent node per turn, and the Attacker constrained to moving
to a node at a distance at most S nodes away per turn. Of course, during his/her
attack the Attacker must stay still. In the ‘spy-game’ introduced by Cohen et al.
[2016], the Attacker (identified as the Robber) wins if he/she ever gets a distance
δ away from the Patroller (identified as the Cop, who in their game can see the
Attacker). If we take δ = m+ 1, and tell the Attacker to begin his/her attack (and
stay still ever since) as soon as he/she has achieved distance δ, then the Patroller
cannot intercept the attack given his/her unit speed, their initial distance and the
attack duration. This idea yields a connection between the Patroller-Attacker games
and what are known as the Cops and Robber games, see, Aigner and Fromme [1984].
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In Chapter 2, we study the distribution of illegal activity in a population of my-
opic inspectees (e.g., tax payers) interacting under the pressure of a short-sighted
benevolent inspector (e.g., tax inspector). Equivalently, we investigate the spread
of corruption in a population of myopic bureaucrats (e.g., ministerial employees)
interacting under the pressure of an incorruptible supervisor(e.g., governmental fraud
investigator). We consider two game settings with regards to the inspectees’ available
strategies, where the continuous strategy setting is a natural extension of the discrete
strategy setting we initially consider. We introduce, and vary both qualitatively and
quantitatively, two key control elements that govern the deterministic evolution of
the illegal activity in the population, the punishment fine and the inspection budget.
We derive the ODEs (2.12) and (2.27) that characterize the dynamics of our
system. In particular, we identify explicitly the fixed points that occur under our
different scenarios, and we carry out respectively their stability analysis. We show
that although the indistinguishable ‘agents’ (e.g., inspectees, corrupted bureaucrats)
are treated as myopic maximizers, profitable strategies eventually prevail in their
population through imitation. We verify that an adequately financed inspector
achieves an increasingly law-abiding environment when there is a stricter fine policy.
We show, however, that although the inspector can establish any desirable average
violation by suitably manipulating his/her renewable budget and his/her fine policy,
he/she is not able to combine this with any desirable group’s strategy profile. Finally,
we provide a game-theoretic interpretation of the limiting dynamics fixed points
stability analysis (link with the Nash equilibria of the corresponding N-player game).
There are many directions towards which one can extend our approach.
To begin with, one can consider an inspector experiencing policy-adjusting costs.
Equivalently, one can withdraw the assumption of a renewable budget. Moreover,
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the case of two or more inspectors, possibly collaborating with each other or even
with some of the inspectees, could be examined. Regarding the inspectees, an
additional source of interaction based on the social norms established within their
population could be introduced. Another interesting variation would be to add
a spatial distribution of the population, assuming indicatively that the inspectees
interact on a specific network. Some of these alternatives have been studied for
similar game settings; see, e.g., Kolokoltsov [2014], Kolokoltsov and Malafeyev [2015].
In Chapter 3 we formulate the interaction of a large number of small players under
the pressure of a major player (principal), on n-dimensional arrays, having in mind
the paradigm of individuals defending against a bio-terrorist; alternatively, the
similar context of corrupted tax inspectors against a benevolent authority. The n-
dimensional arrays dual structure naturally describes on the one hand the distribution
of individuals among m levels of ‘behaviour’ (e.g. levels of defence) and on the
other, their distribution according to a phenotypic characteristic among n levels
of ‘hierarchy’ (e.g. levels of infection). Transitions on the first structure is mainly
subject to the individuals’ control, while transitions on the second is mainly subject
to the principal’s pressure. Transitions on both structures may also be an outcome
of the individuals’ binary interactions. Our model is a performance of a finite state
non-linear Markov game combining mean-field, evolutionary, and pressure-resistance
types of interaction.
For our analysis, we consider the discounted mean-field game consistency
problem. We demonstrate the kinetic equations governing the evolution of the
individuals’ distribution among the n×m states (forward equation), and the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation giving the individuals’ optimal payoff (backward equation).
We solve the stationary problem and we provide a link of the stationary solution
to the time-dependent problem. For simplicity, we work in the asymptotic regimes
of fast execution of personal decisions, weak binary interactions, and small payoff
discounting in time. Considering a stationary control that is consistent with the
assumption of fast execution of personal decisions, in the main order of small payoff
discounting in time (or in the main order of weak binary interactions), we find
that individuals will be uniformly distributed among the ‘behaviours’ of the unique
‘hierarchy’ level where the sum of rewards is maximised, and we obtain the optimal
payoff as a function of these rewards. We show that there is a unique solution to the
time-dependent problem, that is very close to the stationary solution.
Our simplifications, while necessary for concrete calculations, consist only the
first step towards a more comprehensive treatment of the game we have formulated.
In Chapter 4, we introduce the characteristic of limited vision to the Attacker in a
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network patrolling game by letting him/her see, at the beginning of every period,
whether or not the Patroller is present at the node he/she is planning to attack.
Obviously, the Attacker will not initiate the attack when the Patroller is present, and
we further show here that optimally he/she will also not immediately attack when
the Patroller leaves his/her node, but will rather wait an optimal number of periods,
resetting his/her count if the Patroller returns before that time. This behaviour
is in stark contrast to the optimal behaviour when the Patroller follows a known
periodic tour of the network, where an immediate attack is often the best strategy.
For example many prison escape movies show the prisoners (i.e. the Attackers)
attempting to escape just after the spotlight (i.e. the Patroller) leaves their location.
We have adopted here the assumption that the Patroller’s motion can be
observed (and therefore be recorded) prior to the beginning of the game, or generally
speaking, that is somehow a known element of the game. That is, we consider a
Stackelberg game approach. However, an interesting observation of our analysis and
results for several networks is that, in fact, the Attacker has an optimal strategy
that does not require any prior knowledge of the Patroller’s motion. In other words,
there exists a Nash equilibrium between the Patroller and the Attacker.
A number of possible extensions of our model naturally suggest themselves
after our results are further taken into consideration. For one, it would be interesting
to give the Attacker a greater range of vision, perhaps initially to nodes adjacent
to the planned attack node. Of course, if the Attacker has significant vision in this
respect, he/she might have an incentive to move away from the Patroller’s current
location by changing his/her choice of which node to attack. This approach might
then lead to one-sided information in the so called Cops and Robbers games, with
only the Robbers (the Attacker in our case) having vision. In terms of the search and
pursuit-evasion games wording, this might be called a search-evasion game approach.
Another extension to our model, seemingly rather difficult to deal with, would be to
provide the Patroller with the same range of motions, that is mixtures over general
walks, that was allowed in the original formulation of network patrolling games,
Alpern, Morton and Papadaki [2011]. A first step towards this direction would be to
introduce Markovian strategies with short memories.
Moreover, our model raises the question of why patrols are ever carried
out with uniforms that give to a potential attacker or infiltrator additional helpful
information. One answer might lie in the direction of deterrence. Under some of our
game parameters, where the interception probability is relatively high, the Attacker
might choose to abandon his/her attempt altogether, leading to a non zero-sum game.
Clearly, the Uniformed Patroller model leads to many open, unanswered questions.
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